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ASSESSING THE STRATEGIC SITUATION UNDERLYING
INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST COOPERATION
Weimin Shen *
ABSTRACT
This Article disputes the widely held view that the strategic situations
underlying antitrust cooperation among developed antitrust regimes and
developing antitrust regimes are similar, particularly the conclusion that the
current set of policy options to address private and hybrid public-private
restraints of trade is feasible in all situations. This Article utilizes an empirical
inquiry into trade flows that affect the general level of antitrust regulations in
open economies (here, Japan and China). Based on this empirical foundation,
the current set of policy options are explored, including the extraterritoriality of
U.S. antitrust law, Section 301’s competition-related clause, the World Trade
Organization dispute settlement, and bilateral cooperation mechanisms. This
Article contends that each policy option is feasible only to address competitionrelated trade concerns in developed antitrust regimes, but is ill-equipped to
address competition-related trade concerns in emerging market economies that
are in the process of developing antitrust regimes. Thus, when one compares the
successful cooperation and convergence in developed antitrust regimes with the
failed attempts to increase cooperation and convergence in emerging market
economies, it indicates that the existing paradigm in antitrust cooperation is less
likely to preempt the need to resort to a multilateral framework. The comparison
further suggests that the optimal antitrust regime for a global integrated
economy is to strengthen a network of bilateral agreements, supplemented by
efforts toward a multilateral agreement.

*
LL.M, J.S.D., Washington University School of Law. Many thanks to Melissa A. Waters and John N.
Drobak for the excellent insights and suggestions on earlier drafts of this Article. This Article benefited from
comments and suggestions provided by the participants at the American Society of International Law Mid-Year
Research Forum. I also thank the editors from Emory International Law Review for feedback and edits.
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INTRODUCTION
Antitrust laws shape the market order and define the power that large
companies should have in society and the extent to which the state is active in
regulating economic participants. 1 This task has become increasingly difficult
in the wake of globalization and economic interdependence. 2 There is ample
1
See Anu Bradford, Assessing Theories of Global Governance: A Case Study of International Antitrust
Regulation, 39 STAN. J. INT’L L. 222 (2003).
2
While this challenge is not new, it has led to the development of extraterritorial application of domestic
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evidence that private barriers to trade are replacing the progress made by the
World Trade Organization (WTO) in eliminating government-sponsored
barriers to trade. 3 Entrenched businesses and states themselves face perverse
motivations to rebuild barriers for private and national purposes. 4 Some critics
argue that trade liberalization has laid the foundation for private and mixed
abuse. 5 Other critics of globalization claim that countries have lowered their
regulatory standards to improve their relative competitive position in the global
economy. 6
International organizations such as the WTO, the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), and bilateral intergovernmental groups
have actively debated the appropriate national or international policy responses. 7
At the European Union’s request, the WTO established the Working Group on
Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy at its WTO Ministerial
competition law. See American Banana v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909); see also United States v.
Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
3
See Eleanor M. Fox & Janusz Ordover, The Harmonization of Competition and Trade Law: The Case
for Modest Linkages of Law and Limits to Parochial State Action, 19 WORLD COMPETITION L. & ECON. REV. 5
(1995) (discussing factors which inspired initiatives to harmonize nations’ antitrust laws and link antitrust and
trade law); Merit Janow, Private and Public Restraints that Limit Access to Markets, in ORG. FOR ECON. COOP.
& DEV. [OECD], MARKET ACCESS AFTER THE URUGUAY ROUND: INVESTMENT, COMPETITION AND
TECHNOLOGY PERSPECTIVES, ch. 5 (1996) (reviewing the landscape of global problems that implicate
international trade concerns about access to markets, and competition policy concerns about anticompetitive
practices which inhibit the operation of markets).
4
See Eleanor M. Fox, Toward World Antitrust and Market Access, 91 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 3–4 (1997).
5
See, e.g., James D. Southwick, Addressing Market Access Barriers in Japan Through the WTO: A
Survey of Typical Japan Market Access Issues and the Possibility to Address Them Through WTO Dispute
Resolution Procedures, 31 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 923, 963–64 (2000) (stating attempts to treat
anticompetitive practices and market structures in Japan through GATT/WTO mechanisms have been
unsuccessful).
6
See, e.g., Ralph Nader, Preface to LORI WALLACH & MICHELLE SFORZA, WHOSE TRADE
ORGANIZATION?: CORPORATE GLOBALIZATION AND THE EROSION OF DEMOCRACY, at ix, xi (1999) (arguing
WTO decisions on trade issue are anti-democratic and thus lack legitimacy); ALAN TONELSON, THE RACE TO
THE BOTTOM: WHY A WORLDWIDE WORKER SURPLUS AND UNCONTROLLED FREE TRADE ARE SINKING
AMERICAN LIVING STANDARDS 14–15 (2002) (arguing the United States has entered a global competition
without a winner where countries with the lowest wages, weakest workplace safety laws, and toughest repression
of unions have won investments from the United States and Europe.); DALE D. MURPHY, THE STRUCTURE OF
REGULATORY COMPETITION: CORPORATIONS AND PUBLIC POLICIES IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY pts. I, II, V (2004)
(discussing the role of powerful firms in shaping public policies).
7
See Merit E. Janow, The Work of the International Competition Policy Advisory Committee to the
Attorney General and the Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, 2 J. INT’L ECON. L. 441, 442 (1999); Andrew
T. Guzman, Introduction - International Regulatory Harmonization, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 271, 273 (2002)
(discussing three levels of international cooperation: unilateral choice of law rules, harmonization, and
supranational regulation); Spencer Weber Waller, Neo-Realism and the International Harmonization of Law:
Lessons from Antitrust, 42 KAN. L. REV. 557, 558–59 (1994) (noting at least five efforts [the League of Nations,
International Trade Organization, UN. Economic and Social Council, OECD, and U.N. Conference on Trade
and Development] have tried to harmonize antitrust law at the international level, but none have been successful).
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Conference in Singapore to discuss the interaction between trade and
competition policy. 8 The tasks of the Working Group, which were analytical and
exploratory, did not produce any definite agreement. 9
The Fourth Session of the Ministerial Conference held in Doha initially
included antitrust on its negotiating agenda. 10 However, at the 2003 Cancun
Ministerial Meeting, WTO Members failed to reach an explicit consensus for
two notable reasons. 11 First, many developing countries asserted that they were
not ready to negotiate the WTO antitrust agreement due to insufficient resources
or legal and economic expertise to enforce antitrust laws. 12 They also raised
concerns about whether a multilateral framework agreement for antitrust is
beneficial to their national interests. 13 Second, and more importantly, the United
States took a pessimistic stance on further incorporating antitrust issues into the
WTO agenda. 14 The United States was especially worried about the inability to
overcome existing national differences in antitrust regimes. 15 The United States
8
See World Trade Organization, Singapore Ministerial Declaration of 18 December 1996, WTO Doc.
WT/MIN(96)/DEC, ¶ 20 (1996); see also Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition
Policy, Communication from the European Community and Its Member States, WTO Doc. W/WGTCP/W/l15
(1999) [hereinafter Communication from the European Community] (noting Japan, Korea, Switzerland, Norway,
Canada, and Hungary supported the European Union’s position); Bradford, supra note 1, at 230 (“The proposal
of the European Commission requires WTO member states to (1) enact national antitrust laws that would entail
at least core antitrust provisions, (2) establish an effective enforcement mechanism for substantive antitrust laws
respecting principles of nondiscrimination and transparency, (3) set up cooperation devices among antitrust
authorities, and (4) provide for the gradual convergence of national practices.”).
9
Communication from the European Community, supra note 8.
10
See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 20 November 2001, WTO Doc.
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, ¶ 23 (2001) [hereinafter Doha Ministerial Declaration] (“Recognizing the case for a
multilateral framework to enhance the contribution of competition policy to international trade and development,
and the need for enhanced technical assistance and capacity-building in this area . . . , we agree that negotiations
will take place after the Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference on the basis of a decision to be taken, by
explicit consensus, at that Session on modalities of negotiations.”).
11
See Day 5: Conference Ends Without Consensus, WTO (Sept. 14, 2003), https://www.wto.org/english/
thewto_e/minist_e/min03_e/min03_14sept_e.htm.
12
See, e.g., Taimoon Stewart, The Fate of Competition Policy in Cancun: Politics or Substance?, 31
LEGAL ISSUES ECON. INTEGRATION 7, 7–8 (2004); Seung Wha Chang, Interaction Between Trade and
Competition: Why a Multilateral Approach for the United States?, 14 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 1, 4 (2004);
Anu Bradford, When the WTO Works, and How It Fails, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 24 (2010).
13
Chang, supra note 12.
14
Id.
15
See Joel I. Klein, A Reality Check on Antitrust Rules in the World Trade Organization, and a Practical
Way Forward on International Antitrust, in OECD, TRADE AND COMPETITION POLICIES: EXPLORING THE WAYS
FORWARD 37, 41–42 (1999) (discussing what role governments should assign the WTO and/or other
international institutions to deal with international antitrust issues). For a generalized argument opposing
international cooperation, see generally Paul B. Stephan, The Futility of Unification and Harmonization in
International Commercial Law, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 743 (1999). Stephan argues the expert groups that produce
international conventions and model laws are likely to produce either vague norms that impose no significant
constraint on domestic decisionmakers, or precise rules that benefit discrete interest groups. Id.; see also Paul B.
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was also concerned that this possible future role of the WTO would lead to a
weak and ineffective regime. 16
Such failures to negotiate an agreement on antitrust and other Singapore
Conference issues resulted in the collapse of the Cancun Ministerial
Conference. 17 Following the collapse of negotiations in Cancun, the WTO
General Council decided to drop antitrust policy from the Doha Development
Agenda. 18 Few have suggested that WTO antitrust negotiations will be revived
soon. 19
The United States traditionally considers both trade and antitrust policy
options to overcome anticompetitive practices around the world that inhibit
access to markets and trade. 20 Such alternative policy tools include
extraterritoriality of U.S. antitrust law, Section 301’s competition-related clause,
and the WTO dispute settlement process. 21 These policy options have been
suggested in response to the claims of many American companies that their
access to and expansion into Japanese markets have been blocked by both public
and private restraints of trade which might at least partially boost the U.S. trade

Stephan, The Political Economy of Choice of Law, 90 GEO. L. J. 957 (2002) (responding to Professor Andrew
Guzman’s Choice of Law: New Foundations, 90 Geo L. J. 333 (2002), and arguing that Guzman’s normative
analysis may place too great confidence in the ability of multilateral, multi-tasked organizations such as the
WTO to coordinate the allocation of regulatory jurisdiction); Paul B. Stephan, Accountability and International
Lawmaking: Rules, Rents, and Legitimacy, 17 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 681 (1996–97) (arguing that citizens face
higher costs monitoring international rules than domestic rules).
16
See Merit E. Janow, Public, Private, and Hybrid Public/Private Restraints of Trade: What Role for the
WTO, 31 L. & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 977, 979–80 (2000) (arguing those competition policy undertakings likely to
be agreed upon at the international level are likely to be very general and therefore not truly justifiable if they
are subject to WTO dispute settlement).
17
See Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 10; see also Bradford, supra note 12, at 24 n.104
(“Developing countries have also kept off the table issues including labor rights, which the United States has
demanded, and environmental issues, which the European Union has endorsed.”).
18
See World Trade Organization General Council, Decision Adopted by the General Council on 1 August
2004, WTO Doc. WT/L/579 (Aug. 2, 2004).
19
See, e.g., Bradford, supra note 12, at 18 (arguing an international legal framework like the WTO failed
to negotiate an antitrust agreement due to: (1) disagreement between the great economic powers on the need

to negotiate a WTO antitrust agreement; (2) little support by these great powers of the international
antitrust agreement; (3) ex ante uncertainty regarding winners and losers under the prospective antitrust
agreement which obstructed states’ ability to devise these types of issue linkages and, as a result,
compromised their ability to solve distributional conflict; (4) the likelihood of defection and need for an
enforcement mechanism was a lesser concern in antitrust negotiations, diminishing the need to pursue
cooperation within the WTO; (5) little benefits of antitrust cooperation in the WTO).
20
See Chang, supra note 12, at 9, 25–30; Fox, supra note 4, at 11; Angela Huyue Zhang, Strategic Comity,
44 YALE J. INT’L L. 281, 288–97 (2019).
21
Fox, supra note 4, at 11.
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deficit. 22 The United States has implemented these policy tools in the Japanese
context, however, without much success. 23
For these reasons, positive comity is a substantial development. The United
States decided to seek strategies that require as little cooperation as possible
while still achieving a reasonably efficient regulatory outcome. 24 The U.S.
antitrust authorities made efforts to enter into bilateral antitrust cooperation
agreements with foreign counterparts, calling for day-to-day enforcement
relationships of trust to benefit both parties. 25 The United States has also taken
initiative by leading discussions on positive comity within the OECD to build
consensus on an international agreement on positive comity. 26 The general U.S.
position is that cooperative arrangements among antitrust authorities are
superior solutions to initiating a WTO action. 27
All the above policy options have been considered in response to the recent
restraints on trade—both private and a hybrid of public and private—applied in
China. 28 With respect to Section 301, aggressive unilateralism has not been a
viable option since China joined the WTO in 2001. 29 The pursuit of trade
sanctions could lead to counter-suits against the United States. 30 With respect to
Id. at 9.
See discussion infra Section III.A.
24
See Joel I. Klein, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., A Note of Caution with Respect to
a WTO Agenda on Competition Policy (Nov. 18, 1996), in The Remarks Before the Royal Institute of
International Affairs, DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/atr/speech/note-caution-respect-wto-agendacompetition-policy (stating that “positive comity” agreements are the best way to ensure effective antitrust
enforcement in cases involving market access problems).
25
See Klein, supra note 15, at 39.
26
See generally OECD Comm. on Competition Law and Pol’y, CLP Report on Positive Comity, OECD
Doc. DAFFE/CLP(99)19 (June 14, 1999) [hereinafter Report on Positive Comity] (discussing the policy context
and historical background of positive comity, the relationship between positive and negative comity, the
relationship between positive comity and other forms of cooperation, the development and use of positive
comity, and positive comity’s potential contribution to improved competition enforcement and to the avoidance
of jurisdictional disputes); REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF COMPETITION LAW RULES:
COORDINATION AND CONVERGENCE, 1999 A.B.A. SEC. ANTITRUST L. & INT’L L. & PRAC. (reviewing efforts to
develop international competition law rules or guidelines in which the United States has participated, including
OECD Multinational Guidelines in the 1970s and 1980s, and the OECD Recommendation on Hard Core Cartels
in the 1990s).
27
See, e.g., Chang, supra note 12, at 11–12, 31; Bradford, supra note 1, at 240–42; Kal Raustiala, The
Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law,
43 VA. J. INT’L L. 1 (2002) (stating governments are increasingly working together through transnational
networks, and favoring gradual convergence of competition laws through such cooperation).
28
See discussion infra Parts III and IV.
29
See Anu Bradford, Chinese Antitrust Law: The New Face of Protectionism?, HUFFPOST (Aug. 9, 2008),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/chinese-antitrust-law-the_b_116422.
30
Id.; see also Angela Huyue Zhang, The U.S.-China Trade Negotiation: A Contract Theory Perspective,
51 GEO. J. INT’L L. 809, 840 (2020).
22
23
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the WTO, the current rules offer only fragmentary coverage of competition-type
concerns. 31 The WTO can at most examine trade effects of a few antitrust
violations, with only uncertain prospects of success. 32
The concept of extraterritoriality has always been a highly controversial
issue. 33 In particular, three similar antitrust cases were brought before U.S.
courts against Chinese export cartels. 34 These cases are unusual because the
Chinese defendants did not deny they fixed prices and limited output; instead
they moved to dismiss the suits on the basis that they should be exempt from
antitrust liability since the Chinese government had compelled them to do so. 35
As all three cases were progressing in U.S. district courts, China received
another blow on the trade front. 36
The decisions flowing from these parallel proceedings have created glaring
contradictions in their findings of the relationship between the Chinese
government and its exporters, leading to conflicting positions expressed by the
U.S. executive and judicial branches. 37 These decisions triggered even larger
controversy because three district courts have responded to the tension between
domestic antitrust law and WTO law in three different ways. 38 In addition, these
cases indicate that there are inherent limitations of bilateral cooperation
mechanisms between antitrust authorities from developed market economies

See Janow, supra note 16, at 979.
See Bradford, supra note 29.
33
See, e.g., P.M. Roth, Reasonable Extraterritoriality: Correcting the “Balance of Interests”, 41 INT’L
& COMP. L.Q. 245, 251–52 (1992) (discussing the contradictory nature of extraterritoriality); Chang, supra note
12, at 22–24 (“There arise serious theoretical and practical problems when extraterritorial application is to be
undertaken with the purpose of safeguarding the interests of U.S. exporting companies rather than U.S.
consumers.”).
34
In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litigation (Vitamin C I), 584 F. Supp. 2d 546 (E.D.N.Y. 2008); Resco Prods.,
Inc. v. Bosai Minerals Grp., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54949, at *18 (W.D. Pa. June 4, 2010); Animal Sci. Prods.
v. China Nat’l Metals, 702 F. Supp. 2d 320, 413 (D.N.J. 2010), vacated sub nom. Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v.
China Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 462 (3d Cir. 2011).
35
See discussion infra Section III.B.1.
36
First Written Submission of the United States of America, China – Measures Related to the Exportation
of Various Raw Materials, WTO Doc. WT/DS394 (June 1, 2010) [hereinafter First Written Submission, Various
Raw Materials].
37
See, e.g., Dingding Tina Wang, When Antitrust Met WTO: Why U.S. Courts Should Consider U.S.China WTO Disputes in Deciding Antitrust Cases Involving Chinese Exports, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1096 (2012)
(arguing the legal interests of U.S. industry litigants and the U.S. government have starkly diverged; as a result,
U.S. private parties and the U.S. Trade Representative are making contradictory claims about China’s export
practices in parallel forums); Zhang, supra note 20, at 314 (“[M]uch of the judicial response to State-led export
cartels has been static, and judges have failed to appreciate the dynamic features of these cases.”).
38
For a detail discussion of this argument, see infra Section III.B.1.
31
32
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and their counterparts in developing countries or emerging market economies
that are in the process of adopting antitrust regimes. 39
The problems that have been identified are not random. The accession of
developing countries and countries with economies in transition to the WTO
may create even more tensions among countries reflecting the mixed practices
of government and private restrictions. 40 The international community will face
a world where opportunistic behavior is still a characteristic of many areas of
antitrust cooperation. 41 Consequently, the subject of extensive debate and
controversy is whether there is a need to create an international antitrust regime
that could better respond to the ongoing changes in the economic and political
landscape.
This Article departs from the existing scholarly debate on whether there
should be an international competition policy; instead, it focuses on the capacity
of the current set of policy options. This Article examines when it works and
when it does not, given the characteristics of the underlying issue of cooperation
and constraints from the domestic political economy. The goal is to define
whether the current system is better than what might otherwise exist in dealing
with competition-related trade concerns.
This Article disputes the widely held view that the strategic situations
underlying antitrust cooperation among developed and developing antitrust
regimes are similar, particularly the conclusion that the current set of policy
options to address private and hybrid public-private restraints of trade is feasible
in all situations. The central thesis is that the current set of policy options that
the United States has relied upon to address competition-related trade concerns
is attainable only between developed antitrust regimes with highly similar
antitrust laws and legal cultures. The promise of regulatory cooperation and
convergence has culminated through the growing economic integration between

39
See, e.g., Bradford, supra note 1, at 239 (“[C]ooperation between antitrust authorities from developed
market economies and those from developing countries or emerging market economies that are in the process of
adopting antitrust regimes . . . faces very different challenges by reason of the inequality of knowledge,
experience, resources, and the differences in the economic environments in which the regulators operate.”);
Frederic Jenny, International Cooperation on Competition: Myth, Reality and Perspective, 48 ANTITRUST BULL.
973, 991–93 (2003) (arguing there are few antitrust dialogues between developed and developing countries or
between large and small countries).
40
See Janow, supra note 16, at 978.
41
Id.; see also Eleanor M. Fox & Merit E. Janow, China, the WTO, and State-Sponsored Export Cartels:
Where Trade and Competition Ought to Meet, CONCURRENCES (Dec. 2012), https://www.concurrences.com/en/
review/issues/no-4-2012/foreword/china-the-wto-and-state-sponsored-export-cartels-where-trade-andcompetition.
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developed antitrust regimes. 42 Ongoing economic and political landscape
changes make it necessary for these antitrust authorities to cooperate and
exchange views on common antitrust concerns. The similarity of institutional
structures further facilitates cooperation. Hence, achieving bilateral and regional
cooperation among developed antitrust regimes has been more successful than
efforts at the international level among nations with divergent antitrust regimes.
The existing bilateral cooperation mechanisms, including provisions on
information-sharing and positive comity, as well as the new Multilateral Mutual
Assistance and Cooperation Framework for Competition Authorities (MMAC),
fit this description. 43
By comparison, the current set of policy options are ill-equipped to address
private and hybrid public-private restraints of trade in emerging open
economies, many of which are only now creating competition laws as they
liberalize their economies. This empirical study suggests that no policy tool is
sufficient to prevent local favoritism and trade-induced distortions in antitrust. 44
While a consensus at some level could be reached, antitrust protectionism
remains a feature of multijurisdictional antitrust enforcement. 45 These
protectionist pressures can turn antitrust laws into instruments of industrial
policy tools, seriously undermining the gains of trade liberalization.
This Article proceeds in two stages. First, it provides an empirical inquiry
into trade flows that affect the general level of antitrust laws and competition
policies in open economies (in this Article, Japan and China); then it assesses
the desirability and the capacity of the current set of policy options to address
the public, private, and hybrid private–public restraints of trade in the Japanese
context and the Chinese context. Part II discusses how globalization and trade
See discussion infra Part IV.
See infra Part IV.
44
See infra Parts II and III.
45
See Recommendation of the Council for Cooperation between Member Countries in Areas of Potential
Conflict, OECD Doc. C(86)65/Final (1986); Recommendation of the Council on Competition Policy and
Exempted or Regulated Sectors, OECD Doc. C(79)155/Final (1979); 1998 OECD Recommendation of the
Council Concerning Effective Action Against Hard Core Cartels, OECD Doc. C(98)35/Final (1998) (noting a
certain degree of consensus can be reached regarding how to deal with price-fixing, market division, and bidrigging); see also Anu Bradford, Antitrust Law in Global Markets, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS
OF ANTITRUST LAW (2012) (“Antitrust protectionism can take several forms: states may engage in systematic
under or overenforcement of antitrust laws depending on their terms of trade [‘trade-flow bias’]. States may also
exempt domestic firms from antitrust scrutiny altogether [‘statutory bias’]. Similarly, antitrust agencies may
engage in selective enforcement practices, disproportionately targeting foreign firms at the expense of domestic
firms in their investigations [‘enforcement bias’]. Yet the key assumption behind all forms of alleged antitrust
protectionism is the same: each antitrust jurisdiction internalizes the costs and the benefits incurred by its
domestic producers and consumers, while externalizing the costs and the benefits sustained by producers and
consumers in another jurisdiction.”).
42
43
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interact with domestic antitrust laws and competition policies, using Japan and
China as examples. Part III examines how U.S. trade and competition policy
have interacted throughout its historical development during its trade frictions
with Japan and China, and assesses the desirability and the capacity of these
policy options individually in addressing anticompetitive private restraints of
trade in foreign markets. Part IV assesses the desirability and the capacity of
bilateral antitrust cooperation agreements, including provisions on informationsharing and positive comity; and why such arrangements may not produce
positive results between antitrust authorities from developed market economies
and those from developing countries or emerging market economies that are in
the process of adopting antitrust regimes. The Conclusion summarizes the
argument and outlines some possible normative implications that follow from
the discussion.
I.

THE THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL FOUNDATION OF TRADE FLOW BIAS
IN DOMESTIC ANTITRUST LAWS

This Section examines how globalization and trade interact with domestic
antitrust laws and competition policies. Following the WTO accession, some
degree of trade flow bias characterized Japan and China’s doctrines and
enforcement in antitrust. Both countries have pursued export-oriented growth
strategies and applied antitrust laws and competition policies depending on
changes in foreign trade flows. Both countries’ doctrines and enforcement
changes in antitrust are related to their prevailing market conditions and
domestic political economy considerations.
A. Reasons for Seeking Increased Cooperation and Convergence
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was signed in 1947
with the purpose of “the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade
and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international
commerce[.]” 46 The GATT successfully fulfilled its mission and entrusted it to
the WTO, which has made a significant contribution to reducing or eliminating
public trade barriers. 47 Since then, multilateral corporations’ activities spanned
global markets. 48 It is increasingly common to find a company headquartered in
46
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, at 1
[hereinafter GATT].
47
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex 1A, 1867
U.N.T.S. 154.
48
See ROBERT B. REICH, THE WORK OF NATIONS: PREPARING OURSELVES FOR 21ST CENTURY
CAPITALISM ch. 14 (1991).
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the United States but with design and research spread over Europe, Japan, and
North America; production facilities in Latin America and Southeast Asia;
marketing and distribution centers on any of the continents; and investors and
lenders in Japan, Taiwan, “West Germany,” and the United States. 49 As
Professor Robert Reich pointed out, businesses’ production facilities are so
extensive that in many cases, one cannot distinguish “who is us” and “who is
them.” 50
While business activities cross national borders, antitrust laws have
remained domestic. 51 “[T]here are no supranational rules for choice of law,
jurisdictional priority, or proportionality to restrict enforcement.” 52 Under this
laissez-faire system, each jurisdiction proceeds according to its own interests
without concern for the policies of other jurisdictions. 53 This underscores a basic
challenge: the differences between domestic antitrust regimes almost always
lead to “system friction.” 54 Put differently, one country’s antitrust laws and
competition policies may permit conduct that another country’s policies
prohibit.
Emblematic of this viewpoint is Professor Andrew Guzman’s scholarship,
which discusses how trade flow across countries can impact the type of antitrust
laws and competition policies a country adopts. 55 Guzman argues that netimporter countries 56 have an incentive to adopt “stricter-than-optimal antitrust
standards” as they fail to internalize costs produced by foreign exporters. 57
Conversely, net-exporter countries 58 have an incentive to enact laxer-thanoptimal antitrust standards to externalize costs to foreign consumers. 59 This
behavior rests on the idea that, as rational actors who seek to maximize their

49

Id.
Id. chs. 10, 25.
51
See Bradford, supra note 1, at 224 (noting there are no supranational rules for choice of law,
jurisdictional priority, or proportionality to restrict enforcement in antitrust).
52
Id.
53
See Guzman, supra note 7, at 271 (arguing a system of no international cooperation in antitrust will
almost always lead to overlapping jurisdictions, conflicting legal regimes, and over-regulation).
54
See Sylvia Ostry, Policy Approaches to System Friction: Convergence Plus, in NATIONAL DIVERSITY
AND GLOBAL CAPITALISM 333, 333 (Suzanne Berger & Ronald Dore eds., 1996) (arguing the priority target for
harmonization is competition policy, which affects both trade and innovation).
55
See Andrew Guzman, The Case for International Antitrust, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 355, 356–63
(2004).
56
Meaning their share of global production is lower than their share of consumption.
57
Guzman, supra note 55.
58
Meaning their share of global production exceeds their share of consumption.
59
Guzman, supra note 55.
50
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national interest, each state will adjust its antitrust laws and competition policies
strategically to take trade flows into account. 60
The argument of “statutory bias” is manifested in most export cartels and
industry exemptions. 61 Guzman acutely observed:
Several strategies are available to governments that wish to favor firms
over consumers. The easiest of these, the . . . export cartel exemption,
is a relatively crude instrument because it applies only if all of a firm’s
production is exported. A more nuanced strategy is to change the
state’s substantive laws. This benefits all firms, including those that
sell some of their goods domestically. Returning to the example of a
country that exports most but not all of its production in imperfectly
competitive industries, the government could react to the pattern of
trade by weakening its competition laws. This strategy opens the door
to more anticompetitive activity by local firms than would be the case
in the absence of trade, yet it retains some limits on conduct to protect
local consumers. 62

Even if double standards are not explicitly called for on the surface, there is a
risk that foreign firms may encounter an unfavorable ruling at the administrative
level (enforcement bias). 63 This is because the regulators themselves have a
more favorable view of local firms, or political leaders have pressured the
regulators to pursue foreign firms. 64 In these situations, local firms doing
business benefit and enjoy an advantage over foreign competitors. 65
Using an empirical inquiry into trade flow bias, statutory bias, and
enforcement bias, the following sections discuss the causal relationship between
the changes in net-exporter countries’ trade flow, and their antitrust laws and
competition policies. This empirical study suggests that the optimal antitrust
rules might differ between net-exporting countries and net-importing countries.

60

Id.
Id.
62
Id. at 358.
63
Id. at 356. Bias enforcers may resort to excessively rigid enforcement of foreign corporations. Id.
Examples of this argument in the Chinese context are discussed in Section III.B.3.
64
Id.
65
Id.
61
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B. Linkages Between Changes in Trade Flows and Changes in Domestic
Antitrust Laws
Japan joined GATT in 1955 with the strong support of the United States. 66
Fearing that Japan’s low wages would lead to import competition, fourteen other
GATT parties initially invoked Article XXXV to restrict their liberalization
commitments. 67 Consequently, Japan’s GATT accession left the United States
with a heavy burden of accepting massive exports. 68 Since then, Japan and the
United States have had a series of trade frictions that peaked in the mid-1980s.69
The United States enticed China to comply with the WTO framework in
2001. 70 The other WTO members would engage China diplomatically with a
message: if China opened its market, the WTO system would allow China’s
involvement in the international community and the expansion of cultural and
economic links. 71 The WTO accession directly led to China becoming the thirdlargest exporter in world merchandise trade in 2004. 72
The most salient common element in the above two events is the size of the
bilateral trade imbalances. Figure 1 shows that the bilateral trade deficit with
Japan and China accounted for a large proportion of the total U.S. trade deficit.
From the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, Japan’s share fluctuated between thirtyfive percent and sixty-five percent. 73 Japan’s share began to decline in the 1990s
and reached about ten percent in the late 2000s. Since then, it has remained
below ten percent. As shown in Figure 1, the opposite pattern was observed in
China. By the end of the 1980s, China’s share was less than ten percent. Since
the early 1990s, it has continued to grow, reaching thirty-one percent in 2008.
In recent years, China’s share has reached nearly fifty percent.

66
Chad P. Bown & Rachel McCulloch, U.S.-Japan and U.S.-China Trade Conflict: Export Growth,
Reciprocity, and the International Trading System 6 (World Bank, Working Paper No. WPS 5102, 2009)
(discussing how both Japan in the 1950s through the 1990s and China since the late-1970s have followed similar
strategies of promoting economic growth through rapid acquisition of advanced foreign technology and
expansion of manufactured exports).
67
Id.
68
Id.; see also Shujiro Urata, US–Japan Trade Frictions: The Past, the Present, and Implications for the
US–China Trade War, 15 ASIAN ECON. POL’Y REV. 141, 145 (2020).
69
Urata, supra note 68, at 144.
70
See Robert Zoellick, Deputy Secretary of State, Keynote Address to the National Committee on U.S.–
China Relations (Sept. 21, 2005).
71
Id.
72
See Press Release, WTO, Developing Countries’ Goods Trade Share Surges to 50-Year Peak (Apr. 14,
2005), https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres05_e/pr401_e.htm.
73
See infra Figure 1. A color-coded version of Figure 1 can be found online at https://scholarlycommons.
law.emory.edu/eilr.
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In terms of gross domestic product (GDP), the relationship between the
United States, Japan, and China changed notably from the 1980s to the 2010s.74
Figure 2 shows the United States has retained its position of being the world’s
largest economy. The period between roughly 1985 and 1990 was a time of
unparalleled prosperity in Japan. During the economic boom, Japan rapidly
became the world’s second-largest economy, but Japan’s GDP stopped growing
after the bubble economy burst in the early 1990s. The ratio of Japan’s GDP to
the United States’ GDP increased sharply from less than forty percent in the
early 1980s to seventy percent in 1995, and then dropped sharply to a level of
twenty-five percent in 2017. Figure 2 makes clear that the situation in China is
the opposite. By 1995, the ratio of China’s GDP to that of the United States was
about ten percent, but then it grew rapidly, reaching more than sixty percent in
2017. 75 In short, the last fifty years have seen some remarkable changes in the
economic environment surrounding the United States, Japan, and China, with
the latter two countries exporting a large percentage of their goods to the United
States. 76

Source: U.S. Trade in Goods by Country, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/
balance/index.html (last accessed May 15, 2021).

74
See infra Figure 2. A color-coded version of Figure 2 can be found online at https://scholarlycommons.
law.emory.edu/eilr.
75
Id.
76
See Bown & McCulloch, supra note 66, at 3–6.
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Source: GDP (Current US$) - United States, Japan, China, WORLD BANK, https://data.worldbank.org/
indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=US-JP-CN (last accessed May 15, 2021).

Trade law has been liberalized. As trade barriers fell, Japan and China
suffered excess capacity. Both states believed that cartels were an effective way
to eliminate excess capacity by allowing troubled companies to solve their
mutual problems. 77 In Japan, inflation stoked by rising oil prices around 1973
and 1979 legitimized cartels. 78 In 1977, eighty-six officially-registered export
cartels accounted for twenty to thirty percent of all exports from Japan. 79 In
1978, the Japanese government adopted a program of adjustment assistance to
remedy excess capacity problems. 80 One of its main adjustment tools (in use
since 1953) was the cartelization of basic industries. 81 A famous example is the
Japanese treatment of their Keiretsu. 82 The United States has accused Japan of
See Zhang, supra note 20, at 287.
See Akinori Uesugi, Japan’s Cartel System and Its Impact on International Trade, 27 HARV. INT’L. L.
J. 389, 389 (1986). Oil shocks drastically changed the relative competitiveness of different Japanese industry
sectors. Id. Japan’s manufacturing industries, particularly automobiles and electronics, remained highly
competitive while its basic industries suffered from increased import competition and excess capacity. Id.
79
See Marek Martyniszyn, Export Cartel: Is It Legal to Target Your Neighbour? Analysis in Light of
Recent Case Law, 15 J. INT’L ECON. L. 181, 217 (2012).
80
See Uesugi, supra note 78, at 389.
81
Id. at 390. Japan has had depression cartel systems and rationalization cartel systems as important
policy tools for adjustment since 1953. Id.
82
See Nina Hachigian, Essential Mutual Assistance in International Antitrust Enforcement, 29 INT’L
LAW. 117, 124 (1995); see also Julian Epstein, The Other Side of Harmony: Can Trade and Competition Laws
77
78

SHEN_8.2.22

498

8/22/2022 2:36 PM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36

being excessively tolerant to arrangements that deprive outside companies of
economic opportunity. 83 The Japanese government denies these accusations and
permits such associations. 84 The differing national views of antitrust led to
varying opinions regarding the Japanese treatment of Keiretsu. This caused
antitrust agencies on both sides to be unwilling to help each other prosecute
certain types of conduct. 85
More recently, many of China’s industries have suffered excess capacity
from the transition of China’s previous planned economy to a socialist market
economy. 86 In the mid-1990s, of the ninety-four significant categories of
industrial products in China, there was excess capacity in sixty-one. 87 The
capacity utilization rate was below fifty percent in thirty-five of them. 88 As
expected, excess capacity led to excessive competition. 89 Fears about excessive
competition spread to China’s export sector, which sparked accusations that
Chinese exporting companies were dumping their goods into foreign markets. 90
To rein in excessive competition, the Chinese government exempted cartels as a
means to restore certain price controls that had been abolished in price reform. 91
Returning to the theory of trade flow bias, the combination of trade and
consumption patterns shows how the competition policies of net exporting
countries and net importing countries will differ. 92 According to Guzman,
trade’s net effect depends on the ratio of a country’s global share of production

Work Together in the International Marketplace?, 17 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 343, 361 (2002) (noting the Japanese
distribution system is largely controlled by “[i]nterlocking vertical relationships—often referred to as Keiretsus”
which “are an important part of the economic fabric in Japan but might be considered verboten” by U.S. and
European rules).
83
See Hachigian, supra note 82, at 124 (citing Seminar Examines Operation and Impact of Keiretsu
System, 61 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BL) 616, 617 (1991)); Robert L. Cuts, Capitalism in Japan: Cartels
and Keiretsu, HARV. BUS. REV., July 1, 1992, at 48.
84
See Hachigian, supra note 82, at 124.
85
Id.
86
See Wentong Zheng, Transplanting Antitrust in China: Economic Transition, Market Structure, and
State Control, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 643, 667–79 (2010) (discussing structural distortions behind China’s excess
capacity).
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
See Yanlin Sun & John Whalley, China’s Anti-Dumping Problems and Mitigation Through Regional
Trade Agreements, 24 CHINA & WORLD ECON. 87, 92–93 (2016). From 1995 to 2013, China was the largest
recipient of both anti-dumping initiations and anti-dumping measures. Id. at 89. The anti-dumping initiations
against China contributed to 21.89% of total anti-dumping filings worldwide, while anti-dumping measures
against China account for 24.78% of total measures worldwide. Id.
91
See Zheng, supra note 86, at 687.
92
See Guzman, supra note 55, at 358.
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to its global share of consumption of imperfectly competitive goods. 93 In
looking at the U.S. bilateral trade imbalances with Japan and China, both China
and Japan are net exporter countries. Therefore, the two countries tend to
consider a larger portion of the policies’ impact on producers rather than on
consumers, resulting in a more permissive competition policy regime to benefit
producers’ interests.
The resulting antitrust laws and competition policies represent attempts by
both countries to externalize costs while internalizing benefits. This is
domestically optimal, but is suboptimal from a global perspective because some
costs and benefits are ignored. 94 Considering China and Japan’s political
economies, trade has caused their antitrust doctrines to deviate from their preWTO ones, representing a move away from the optimal global policies. Viewed
in this context, the alleged trade flow bias can be plausible in both cases.
Importantly, this argument does not mean that the antitrust systems in Japan
and China are the same. They are quite different. Japan’s Antimonopoly Law
was enacted in 1947 under the strong influence of U.S. antitrust laws. 95
Although antitrust laws and policies in the Japan and the United States continue
to share many fundamental similarities, considerable differences have developed
due to each country’s cultural, social, economic, and legal backgrounds. 96 These
differences have led to differing competitive environments. 97 In turn, this has
surfaced as a structural issue in U.S.–Japan trade relations. 98 From the U.S.
perspective, Japan’s exclusionary business practices—such as the Keiretsu and
government interventions in the form of industrial policy spread across
economic activities—made the entry of foreign firms and imports difficult. 99
In the case of China, government intervention is pervasive, and in particular,
important industries are dominated by state-owned enterprises (SOEs). 100 SOEs
that are financially supported by the government do not compete with other firms

Id. at 359.
See infra Section III.A.B.
95
See Hiroshi Iyori, A Comparison of U.S.-Japan Antitrust Law: Looking at the International
Harmonization of Competition Law, 4 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 59, 61 (1995).
96
Id. at 90.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
See Mark Wu, The “China, Inc.” Challenge to Global Trade Governance, 57 HARV. INT’L L.J. 261,
270–73 (2016) (stating China’s SOEs are controlled by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration
Commission of the State Council, developing a different model for state economic oversight and deployment of
state assets).
93
94
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(such as foreign firms) on a level playing field. 101 In addition, the widespread
structural distortions, caused by the roles of the government in the investment
process and exit barriers erected by the government, have prevented China from
pursuing a rigorous anti-cartel policy during its transitional stage. 102 In recent
years, antitrust scholars raised the concern that China’s Antimonopoly Law
reflects the resurgence of protectionist sentiments in China following the
increase in foreign acquisitions of Chinese corporations. 103 “An antitrust law
that on its face is designed to open markets can be a powerful tool to close
them.” 104
Several export restraint cases—what trade officials would call market access
cases—illustrate that changes in trade flows have distorted the two countries’
substantive laws and competition policies. They also highlight the fact that the
U.S. trade deficit might partially result from foreign exporters’ wrongdoings
within their territories. The current policy options to address these concerns,
however, are quite modest, as elaborated below.
II. THE DESIRABILITY AND THE CAPACITY OF THE CURRENT POLICY OPTIONS
This Section traces the evolution of the current policy options in response to
trade flow bias in antitrust. It proceeds from the premise that the United States
has considered both trade and antitrust policy options when breaking down
Japanese markets that have been blocked by private and hybrid public–private
restraints of trade. Involved policy tools include extraterritoriality of U.S.
antitrust law, Section 301’s competition-related clause, and the WTO dispute
settlement process. All the policy tools have also been considered in response to
anti-competition practices in China. This Article examines each policy option
and its capacity in the context of Japan and China.

101

Id.
Professor Wentong Zheng argued that three major forces shape antitrust law and competition policy in
China: China’s current transitional stage, China’s market structures, and pervasive state control in China’s
economy. See Zheng, supra note 86. These forces have further limited the applicability of Western antitrust
models to China in three major areas of antitrust: cartels, abuse of dominant market position, and merger review.
Id. Zheng also detailed how these forces have (1) prevented China from pursuing a rigorous anti-cartel policy,
(2) led to a mismatch between monopoly abuses that are prohibited under the Anti-Monopoly Law of the
People’s Republic of China (AML) and monopoly abuses that are most prevalent in China’s economy, and (3)
prevented the merger review process under the AML from being meaningfully applied to domestic firms. Id.
103
See, e.g., Bradford, supra note 29.
104
Id. at 2.
102
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A. A Historical Dimension: Weighing Trade and Antitrust
1. The Japanese Export Cartels and Extraterritorial Application of U.S.
Antitrust Law
“[U]ntil the 1970s, U.S. antitrust law was mainly regarded as domestic law,
and the antitrust authorities normally did not seek an international application of
antitrust laws.” 105 This can be evidenced by the fact that Congress had not taken
any legislative action for an international application of antitrust law until it
enacted the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act (FTAIA) in 1982. 106 As
part of a plan to free business from excessive government regulation, the 1982
FTAIA focused on output-limiting conduct that provably raises prices to U.S.
consumers. 107 FTAIA also made clear that U.S. law does not follow U.S. firms
into foreign markets. 108
The new paradigm was put into operation by a variety of Department of
Justice (DOJ) guidelines. These included the 1982 DOJ Merger Guidelines, 109
the 1985 DOJ Vertical Restraint Guidelines, 110 and the 1988 DOJ Antitrust
Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations (1988 Guidelines). 111 In
particular, the 1988 Guidelines contained the famous footnote 159, which stated:
“The Department is concerned only with adverse effects on competition that
would harm US consumers by reducing output or raising prices.” 112

See Chang, supra note 12, at 9.
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6a, 45(a)(3).
107
See, e.g., Fox, supra note 4, at 10; Lina M. Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 716
(2016). Khan argues a structure-based view of competition has been replaced by price theory in the 1970s and
1980s. Id. Antitrust law now assesses competition largely with an eye to the short-term interests of consumers,
not producers or the health of the market as a whole. Id. Antitrust doctrine views low consumer prices, alone, to
be evidence of sound competition. Id.
108
See Fox, supra note 4, at 10.
109
1982 Merger Guidelines, U.S. Dep't of Just. Archives, https://www.justice.gov/archives/atr/1982-mergerguidelines#:~:text=The%20unifying%20theme%20of%20the,if%20the%20market%20were%20competitive
(last accessed Feb. 23, 2022).
110
The federal guidelines were withdrawn by Anne Bingaman early in her tenure as President Clinton’s
first Assistant Attorney General of the Antitrust Division of the DOJ. See Anne K. Bingaman, Assistant Att’y
Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Antitrust Enforcement, Some Initial Thoughts and Actions, Address
Before the Antitrust Section of the American Bar Association (Aug. 10, 1993), https://www.justice.gov/atr/
speech/antitrust-enforcement-some-initial-thoughts-and-actions (rescinding the DOJ Vertical Restraint Guidelines).
111
See Fox, supra note 4, at 10; see also Donald I. Baker & Bennett Rushkoff, The 1988 Justice
Department International Guidelines: Searching for Legal Standards and Reassurance, 23 CORNELL INT’L L.J.
406, 410–11.
112
See Fox, supra note 4, at 10; see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just. Dep’t Will Challenge
Foreign Restraints on U.S. Exports Under Antitrust L. (Apr. 3, 1992), https://www.justice.gov/archive/atr/
public/press_releases/1992/211137.htm.
105
106
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With the sudden increase of Japanese exports into U.S. markets, a perceived
need for U.S. antitrust authorities against foreign activities emerged. 113 “This
was due to then rising concerns that the U.S. trade deficit might be . . . a result
of the wrongdoings of foreign exporters within their own territories.” 114 For
example, certain U.S. firms claimed that their entry and expansion into Japanese
markets had been blocked by private and hybrid public–private restraints of
trade. 115 Many also assumed that Japanese exporters colluded in price-fixing
within Japan, and such collusive price-fixing hurt the U.S. market. 116
Considering these mixed governmental and private problems in the Japanese
context, the U.S. antitrust authorities recognize their cases increasingly require
engagement with competition authorities in other jurisdictions on issues that
benefit from being considered in a broader, cross-border context. “The U.S.
antitrust and trade officials had an idea: the synergistic use of trade and antitrust
obligations” to deal with such problems. 117 As it happened, however, the famous
footnote 159 impeded U.S. antitrust authorities from enforcing their own
antitrust law against such foreign activities. 118 Congress and the DOJ therefore
had to grapple with the question of whether the extraterritorial application of the
law would be possible in cases where an anticompetitive activity harms U.S
exporters’ interests, not just U.S. consumers’ interests. 119
“In 1992, the Bush Administration formally declared an end to the
requirement of direct harm to U.S. consumers as a condition for the application
of antitrust laws abroad.” 120 The Clinton Administration endorsed this position
and announced that the DOJ would continue to shift policy from solely consumer
protection to greater emphasis on domestic exporter protection in the
extraterritorial application of antitrust law. 121 In the same vein, the DOJ
announced the withdrawal of footnote 159, noting that “extraterritorial
application would also be possible in cases where an anticompetitive activity
113
See Chang, supra note 12, at 9 (arguing this perceived need for U.S. antitrust authorities coincides with
the legislative background for Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974).
114
Id.
115
Id.; see also Fox, supra note 4, at 1.
116
See Chang, supra note 12, at 9.
117
See Fox, supra note 4, at 11.
118
Id.
119
See Epstein, supra note 82, at 349 (citing James S. McNeill, Comment, Extraterritorial Antitrust
Jurisdiction: Continuing the Confusion in Policy, Law, and Jurisdiction, 28 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 425, 448–52
(1998)).
120
Id. at 351 (citing U.S. Dep’t of Just., ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICY (1992), reprinted in 62
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1560, at 483–84.
121
Id. (citing Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Foreign Business Conduct that Harms American Exports
(Apr. 2, 1993), reprinted in 7 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ¶¶ 50, 84).
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harms U.S exporters’ interests, for example, when the activity functions as a
private trade barrier to U.S. exports into a foreign market, whether or not there
is direct harm to U.S. consumers.” 122
In sum, this is a classic feature of the extraterritorial application of antitrust
law involving export activities traditionally covered by trade law and policy. 123
The wording of the DOJ’s statement made it clear that the U.S. antitrust
authorities are willing to use antitrust legislation to promote U.S. trade interests
to complement Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act. 124
This policy option gained significant ground in Matsushita Electric. 125
Zenith, an American manufacturer of consumer electronics, brought suit against
several Japanese firms for creating a cartel to drive U.S. competitors out of the
U.S. market. 126 The Third Circuit ignored the request of the U.S. Executive
Branch and was caught in a complicated factual inquiry of whether any
compulsion existed in this case. 127 Throughout many years of discovery, the two
sides produced thousands of documents and were deposed hundreds of times. 128
In the end, the Third Circuit was still unable to determine whether the cartel was
compelled by the Japanese government or initiated by the companies. 129 The
case was appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court reversed and

122
See Chang, supra note 12, at 21 (citing Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Department of Justice Policy
Statement Regarding Anticompetitive Conduct that Restricts U.S. Exports: Statement of Antitrust Policy (Apr.
3, 1992), reprinted in 4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ¶¶ 13, 108).
123
Id. at 9, 21–22. The FTAIA deals with jurisdictional matters only, not the substantive rules for
determining the illegality of contested activities. Id. However, the 1995 DOJ/FTC Guidelines do not make a
distinction between jurisdictional rules and substantive rules. Id. Therefore, when extraterritorial application is
undertaken to safeguard the interests of U.S. exporting companies rather than U.S. consumers, serious theoretical
and practical problems tend to arise. This is because such position is not consistent with the objective of U.S.
antitrust laws to preserve and foster competition and thereby promote consumers’ interests. Id.
124
Id. at 10; Fox, supra note 4, at 11.
125
In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 251 (3d Cir. 1983), rev’d sub nom.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
126
Id.
127
Brief for the Government of Japan as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 4, Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co., 475 U.S. 574; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 22, Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. 574 (No. 83-2004); see also Ali Ganjaei, Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. V.
Zenith Radio Corp.: The Death Knell for Predatory Price Fixing and the Avoidance of a Standard for the
Foreign Sovereign Compulsion Defense, 15 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 395, 403 (1987) (discussing how the
U.S. Executive Branch filed an amicus brief to support the Japanese government’s position, stating that the
defendants’ conduct should be immune from antitrust liability due to the fact that the Ministry of International
Trade and Industry [MITI] admitted it had directed the Japanese cartel).
128
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1125, 1137 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
129
In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d at 315 (concluding the defendants’ conduct had
violated Japanese domestic law).
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remanded, therefore bypassing the opportunity to grapple with the scope of
compulsion in its final ruling. 130
At least some U.S. exporters suspected the capacity of the extraterritorial
application of U.S. antitrust laws that led to the Kodak–Fuji Film dispute and
the Japan–U.S. Auto Parts case. They resorted to Section 301 of the 1974 Trade
Act and the WTO dispute settlement system to address market-restraint
concerns, examined below.
2. Competition Clause of Section 301
The United States has been a member of GATT since 1947 and therefore has
certain rights to access foreign markets. 131 Due to the longstanding concern that
other member states will not comply with GATT’s obligations, Congress has
delegated Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 as the United States’ most
powerful weapon for addressing market-blocking restraints in foreign
markets. 132
The wording related to competition policy in Section 301 is “unreasonable”
foreign actions, policies, or practices. 133 The 1988 amendment expanded the
definition of “unreasonable practices,” attempting to supplement antitrust law to
eliminate restrictive business practices and thereby open foreign markets. 134 The
definition now states that a government may be found to be acting unreasonably
if it (1) tolerates systematic anticompetitive activities by state-owned enterprises
and/or private firms, (2) denies market access for U.S. firms, or (3) restricts the
sales of U.S. goods or services to a foreign market. 135

130
131
132
133
134

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
GATT, supra note 46.
See 19 U.S.C. § 2411.
Id.; see Chang, supra note 12, at 25.
19 U.S.C. § 2411.
(B) Acts, policies and practices that are unreasonable include, but are not limited to, any act,
policy, or practice, or any combination of acts, policies, or practices, which
(i) denies fair and equitable
....
(IV) market opportunities, including the toleration by a foreign government of systematic
anticompetitive activities by enterprises or among enterprises in the foreign country that have the
effect of restricting, on a basis that is inconsistent with commercial considerations, access of
United States goods or services to a foreign market.

Id.

135

Id.
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The Competition Clause of Section 301 was initially invoked in the 1994
Japan–U.S. Auto Parts case. 136 The Office of the United States Trade
Representative (USTR) initiated an investigation, arguing that the Japanese
government tolerated the Keiretsu, and allowed a market setup that shut out U.S.
auto parts. 137 The USTR requested public comment and held a public hearing on
a proposed determination that the appropriate response would be to impose a
100% percent tariff on luxury motor vehicles from Japan. 138
Japan immediately filed a request for consultations, which was its first WTO
complaint. 139 Japan argued the threatened U.S. retaliation would violate GATT
Articles I (General Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment) and II (Tariff Binding) if
imposed. 140 Japan claimed the announcement and implementation of the Section
301 determination was “inconsistent with the obligations of the Government of
the United States under Article 23 of the [Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU),] which seeks [to]
strengthen[] the multilateral system by specifically prohibiting recourse to
unilateral actions.” 141 The two countries settled on July 19, 1995. 142 The United
States withdrew its threat, and Japan dropped the WTO dispute. 143 Shortly after
the settlement, the USTR initiated another Section 301 investigation on the
grounds that the Japanese government had tolerated Fuji’s anticompetitive
actions, such as restricting distribution channels, thereby limiting the
opportunity for Kodak film to be exported to the Japanese market. 144 This
investigation was frustrated following the Japanese government’s refusal to
negotiate with the United States under Section 301 procedures. 145 Japan’s
136
See Initiation of Section 302 Investigation and Request for Public Comment: Barriers to Access to the
Auto Parts Replacement Market in Japan, 59 Fed. Reg. 52,034 (Oct. 13, 1994) (initiation) [hereinafter Barriers
to Access to the Auto Parts]; Notice of Determination and Request for Public Comment Concerning Proposed
Determination of Action Pursuant to Section 301: Barriers to Access to the Auto Parts Replacement Market in
Japan, 60 Fed. Reg. 26,745 (May 18, 1995) (determination).
137
Barriers to Access to the Auto Parts, supra note 136.
138
Id.
139
Request for Consultations by Japan, United States—Imposition of Import Duties on Automobiles from
Japan Under Sections 301 and 304 of the Trade Act of 1974, WTO Doc. WT/DS6/1 (May 22, 1995).
140
Id.
141
Id. (quotation omitted).
142
Id.; see also C. Taylor O’Neal, Impossible Cases: Lessons from the First Decade of WTO Dispute
Settlement, 28 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 309, 385 (2007) (noting that Japan offered pledges of liberalization that the two
countries would review bi-annually).
143
O’Neal, supra note 142, at 385.
144
See Initiation of Investigation Pursuant to Section 302 Concerning Barriers to Access to the Japanese
Market for Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, 60 Fed. Reg. 35,447 (July 7, 1995) (initiation); Section 304
Determinations: Barriers to Access to the Japanese Market for Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, 61 Fed.
Reg. 30,929 (June 18, 1996) (determination).
145
O’Neal, supra note 142, at 385 (citing Japanese Refusal to Negotiate on Film, Chips Causes Concern,
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position was that any complaints should be submitted to the Japan Fair Trade
Commission (JFTC), because the alleged case concerned Japan’s failure to
enforce its own antitrust laws. 146 It said, “if Japan had accepted USTR’s
jurisdiction in the Japanese film case, it would have ceded JFTC’s authority to
USTR to enforce its competition laws[.]” 147
The fact the Japanese government initiated antitrust investigation procedures
in accordance with its own antitrust law is especially noteworthy. 148 The
Japanese government concluded that no violation of Japanese antitrust law
existed after a formal investigation. 149 From the U.S. position, it was difficult to
interpret “toleration” following the Japanese government’s conclusion that no
violation of Japanese antitrust law existed. 150 This is because the definition of
the Competition Clause of Section 301 stated it could be invoked only when
there is “toleration” by the foreign government of activities in violation of the
foreign country’s antitrust law. 151 The United States thus turned to another
policy option to get at these mixed governmental and private problems in the
Japanese context—the WTO dispute settlement procedures.
3. WTO Dispute Settlement and Competition Issues
In 1995, Kodak successfully persuaded the USTR to utilize the WTO dispute
settlement system against what were mostly private, vertical, non-price restraints
on market access whereby Fuji established distribution channels and prevented
entry by Kodak into the Japanese market. 152 The most critical issue in this case
was whether a “non-violation complaint” under GATT Article XXIII:1(b) could
be a valid channel for subjecting competition-related governmental measures to
WTO dispute settlement in general. 153

13 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 165 (Jan. 31, 1996)); Andrew Pollack, Japan’s Tack on Trade: No More 1-on-1,
N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1996, at D1.
146
See Epstein, supra note 82, at 353.
147
Id. at 353–54 n.41 (citing William Barringer, Competition Policy and Cross Border Dispute
Resolution: Lessons Learned from the U.S.–Japan Film Dispute, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 459, 464 (1997)).
148
See JFTC Report Finds Japan Film Market Free of Anticompetitive Practices, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (July
25, 1997), https://insidetrade.com/inside-us-trade/jftc-report-finds-japan-film-market-free-anticompetitive-practices.
149
Id.
150
See Chang, supra note 12, at 26.
151
Id. at 27.
152
See Epstein, supra note 82, at 352–53.
153
Report of the Panel, Japan—Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, WTO Doc.
WT/DS44/R (Mar. 31, 1998), reprinted in 5 BERNAN’S ANN. REP. 27 (1999) [hereinafter Japan—Film and
Paper].
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The text of Article XXIII:1(b) requires a complaining party to demonstrate
three elements to prevail on non-violation claims: (1) the application of the
measure is attributable to a WTO Member, 154 (2) “the existence of a benefit
accruing . . . under the relevant agreement,” 155 and (3) “the benefit accruing to
the WTO Member (e.g., improved market access from tariff concessions) is
nullified or impaired as the result of the application of a measure by another
WTO Member.” 156 Each element will be discussed to explore whether the WTO
dispute settlement process might be a potential or available policy tool to get at
mixed governmental and private problems in the Japanese context.
For the first element, the complaining party is required to prove the
“measures” in dispute are attributable to the Government of Japan. 157 For this
reason, the United States pointed out three types of policies characteristic of the
Japanese film market: (1) the distribution system between government and
industry, 158 (2) the Large Store Law, which upsets the competitive relationship
between domestic and imported film and paper, 159 and (3) the sales restriction
measures. 160 The United States argued these anticompetitive activities
originated from government measures or that the government intervened in such
activities, thereby nullifying or impairing benefits accruing to the United States
under Article XXIII:1(b). 161
Although the panel tried to envision some objective criteria for this
determination while endorsing the Japan-Semiconductor panel’s ruling, it
ultimately held that it was difficult to establish bright-line rules to prove whether
there was a governmental intervention. 162 The panel thus recommended a caseby-case basis examination in this context. 163 However, the case-by-case

Id. ¶ 10.42.
Id. ¶ 10.61.
156
Id. ¶ 10.82 (emphasis omitted).
157
Id. ¶ 10.39.
158
Id. ¶¶ 10.90, 92. The report argued that MITI and Japanese industry recognized the superiority of
foreign firms following the liberalization of international trade, which may bring serious competition to Japanese
manufacturers and their products. Id. MITI and Japanese manufacturers, therefore, devised a plan to strengthen
vertical distribution channels that would handle the products of a particular domestic manufacturer exclusively.
Id.
159
Id. ¶¶ 10.209, 10.214–33.
160
Id. ¶ 10.234.
161
Id.
162
Id. ¶ 10.56; see also Report of the Panel, Japan—Trade in Semi-Conductors, ¶ 117, L/6309 (May 4,
1988), GATT BISD (35th Supp.) (1989) (confirming a government measure exists if an anticompetitive activity
of a private entity depends upon a governmental decision, and the government provided an incentive for a private
entity to carry out such activities).
163
Id. ¶¶ 10.54–60.
154
155
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approach resulted in the United States’ failure to demonstrate that the alleged
measures were attributable to the Japanese government. 164
As difficult as these mixed governmental and private problems have been in
the Japanese context, the textual language of Article XXIII:1(b) makes it clear
that a purely private measure is not subject to the WTO dispute settlement
procedures. 165 In many cases, anticompetitive restraints of trade may occur
without any visible governmental intervention at all. 166 The “governmental
measure” requirement of Article XXIII:1(b) seems to indicate that the WTO is
an imperfect venue to litigate antitrust matters.
The second required element which must be considered to establish a nonviolation complaint is the existence of a benefit accruing to a WTO Member
under the relevant agreement. 167 As with the first element, the complaining party
has the burden of demonstrating the “benefit accruing.” 168 Usually, the claimed
benefits are those of “legitimate expectations of improved market-access
opportunities arising out of relevant tariff concessions.” 169 This element was
successfully satisfied but was complicated because the United States claimed to
have had expectations of improved market access benefits regarding four
different products granted during three successive rounds of multilateral trade
negotiations. 170
As to the third element, causality, the United States is required to
demonstrate a clear correlation between the governmental measures that it cited
and the adverse effect on the relevant competitive relationships. 171 The panel
considered this element as “one of the more factually complex areas of [their]
examination.” 172 Not surprisingly, the United States failed in its efforts to
establish the necessary causal connection between the alleged “measures,”

Id. ¶¶ 10.121–23 (discussing the alleged measure as not binding law or regulation).
See Janow, supra note 16, at 978–80.
166
See Chang, supra note 12, at 29.
167
See Japan—Film and Paper, supra note 153, ¶ 10.61.
168
Id.
169
Id.
170
Id. ¶ 10.62. This claim raises two general issues. First, may the benefits legitimately expected by a
Member be derived from successive rounds of tariff negotiations? Second, what factors should be considered to
determine if a Member should have reasonably anticipated measures that it claims nullified or impaired benefits?
171
Id. ¶ 10.82.
172
Id. n.1242; see also ¶¶ 10.83–89 (citing Report of the Panel, Uruguayan Recourse to Article XXIII,
¶ 15, L/1923 (Nov. 15, 1962), GATT BISD, at 100; Report of the Panel, Japan—Trade in Semi-Conductors,
supra note 162, at 161; Report of the Panel, US—Agricultural Waiver, ¶¶ 5.20–23, L/6631 (Nov. 7, 1990),
GATT BISD, at 261–62) (noting all complaining parties failed to provide a detailed justification to support their
claims because of a lack of evidence of causality).
164
165
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individually or collectively, and any unfavorable competitive conditions for
imported film and paper. 173
Ultimately, the United States lost this case by failing to demonstrate that the
alleged Japanese measures nullified or impaired benefits accruing to the United
States within the meaning of GATT Article XXIII:1(b). 174 Arguably, such
practices or measures could be violations of required WTO obligations “if there
is sufficient government involvement[.]” 175 In practice, however, as the WTO
panel in the Kodak–Fuji Film dispute illustrates, there are still many obstacles
to satisfy the other two elements. 176 In short, the uncertainty of its success,
coupled with the “governmental measure” requirement in Article XXIII:1(b),
made the WTO dispute settlement process an unappealing—and therefore highly
unlikely—policy option.
The fact that the United States did not appeal is especially noteworthy. The
Appellate Body, therefore, did not have an opportunity to review the legal
rulings of the panel, particularly on non-violation complaints. In this sense, it is
hard to predict whether and to what extent this panel’s rulings will serve as a
precedent for future cases involving competition-related measures. 177 In
addition, the remedies for this non-violation complaint differ from those for
violation complaints. 178 There would be no obligation for the defending party to
withdraw the measure at issue even if the complaining party prevails on a nonviolation claim. 179
Having already discussed the practical challenges underlying the United
States’ extraterritorial application of antitrust law, Section 301’s competitionrelated clause, and the WTO dispute settlement process in the Japanese context,
this Article now turns to several recent U.S. antitrust litigations. Spanning over

173
Id. (discussing four issues related to causation: 1) the degree of causation that must be shown—“but
for” or less; 2) the relevance of the origin-neutral nature of a measure to causation of nullification or impairment;
3) the relevance of intent to causality; and 4) the extent to which measures may be considered collectively in an
analysis of causation).
174
Id.
175
See Japan—Film and Paper, supra note 153, ¶ 10.56 (confirming that actions by private parties could
be deemed governmental if there is “sufficient government involvement”); id. ¶ 10.52 (confirming that when the
government, while providing the incentive to carry out anticompetitive activities, endorses such activities or the
activities are attributable to the government, a “government measure” would be deemed to exist).
176
See Chang, supra note 12, at 30.
177
Id. n.136.
178
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 1, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization art. XXVI.1(b), 1869 U.N.T.S. 401
[hereinafter DSU].
179
Id.
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a decade, these cases linked to recent WTO disputes involved Chinese export
cartels and eventually reached the U.S. Supreme Court.
B. Why the Current Set of Policy Options is Likely to be Limited
This Section explores the desirability and the capacity of the extraterritorial
application of U.S. antitrust law. Three Chinese export cartel cases will be
discussed: the Vitamin C cartel case, the Raw Materials case, and the Rare
Earths case. This Article contends that at least two results are plausible—first,
judicial frustrations with facts; second, the executive’s contrasting stance,
indicating that this policy option for addressing anticompetitive private restraints
of trade is likely to remain limited. This Article also explores essential linkages
between these export cartel litigations and the recent WTO disputes. It further
proposes that U.S. courts accord a high degree of synergism to trade officials
when factual evidence is ambiguous. Following this, this Article examines the
inherent weakness of the competition clause of Section 301 in addressing
China’s unfair trade and competition practices.
1. The Chinese Export Cartels and Extraterritorial Application of U.S.
Antitrust Law
Extraterritorial application of antitrust law occurs in cases where
anticompetitive practices within foreign jurisdictions adversely affect domestic
markets. The existence of the “effects doctrine” as a basis for antitrust
jurisdiction affirms that no state retains exclusive jurisdiction over an antitrust
case. 180 Today, international consensus supports the necessity and legitimacy of
the “effects doctrine,” at least where a cartel is purely private and harm to buyers
in the regulating nation is direct. 181 However, several recent U.S. antitrust
litigations involving Chinese export cartels indicate we should be realistic about
the utility of this policy option.

180
Both the United States and the European Union have applied their antitrust laws to the conduct of
foreign corporations as long the conduct has had an “effect” on their domestic markets. See, e.g., United States
v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443–44 (2d Cir. 1945); Case T-102/96, Gencor Ltd. v. Commission,
1999 E.C.R. 11-753, 89–92.
181
See Fox, supra note 4, at 3; Eleanor M. Fox, National Law, Global Markets, and Hartford: Eyes Wide
Shut, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 73, 79–86 (2000) (describing cases of extraterritorial assertions of antitrust jurisdiction
of both the European Union and United States); Bradford, supra note 12, at 41–42, note 182 (“[M]any other
nations recognize the legitimacy of applying their antitrust laws to the conduct of foreign firms as long as some
anticompetitive effect is felt on the market of the country willing to exercise jurisdiction.”) (citing Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 415 reporters’ note 9 (1987)).
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In In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litigation, a group of U.S. purchasers of
Chinese-manufactured Vitamin C alleged that the Chinese manufacturers’ rise
to dominance in the global Vitamin C market had been facilitated by collusion
among manufacturers. 182 The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants had colluded
with the Chamber of Commerce of Medicines and Health Products Importers
and Exporters (CCCMHPIE) and agreed to limit Vitamin C production and
increase its prices to create a supply shortage in the international market. 183
The Chinese defendants did not deny the allegations. Instead, they moved to
dismiss the suit on the basis that they should be exempt from antitrust liability
since the Chinese government had compelled them to fix prices and limit
output. 184 To prove the existence of the compulsory requirement of the Chinese
law, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce (Ministry) filed an amicus brief
acknowledging that the Chinese government had compelled the cartel’s
activities. 185 In particular, the Ministry explained that the CCCMHPIE is “an
entity under the Ministry’s direct and active supervision that plays a central role
in regulating China’s Vitamin C industry.” 186 Following lengthy pre-trial
discovery, the district court refused to defer to the Ministry’s interpretation of
Chinese law. 187
The case went to trial and the jury subsequently decided that the Chinese
defendants had violated U.S. antitrust law and awarded the plaintiff more than
fifty million U.S. dollars in damages. 188 The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit reversed the judgment entered on the verdict and remanded the case with
instructions to dismiss, stating that China’s word on compulsion should have
been conclusive for the court; thus, the Chinese government compelled the pricefixing. 189
The Second Circuit stated that Chinese manufacturers faced a true conflict
between the U.S. law—not fixing prices in the United States—and the Chinese
law—fixing prices in the United States. 190 China’s interest in protecting its firms
from U.S. law clearly outbalanced the United States’ interests in enforcing its
Vitamin C I, 584 F. Supp. 2d 546, 548–50 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co. (In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig.) (Vitamin C
II), 837 F.3d 175, 180 (2d Cir. 2016).
184
Vitamin C I, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 550.
185
Id. at 552.
186
Id. at 552 (citing Brief for the Chinese Ministry of Commerce as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents).
187
Id. at 557.
188
Vitamin C II, 837 F.3d at 178.
189
Id. at 194.
190
Id. at 186.
182
183
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law, so that the district court abused its discretion as a matter of law in deciding
not to abstain on comity grounds. 191 The court concluded that when a foreign
government whose law is in contention submits an official statement on the
meaning and interpretation of its domestic law, U.S. courts are “bound to defer”
to the foreign government’s construction of its law, whenever that construction
is “reasonable.” 192
In the Animal Science case, several U.S. consumers of magnesite products
filed an antitrust suit against certain Chinese business entities. 193 The U.S.
plaintiffs asserted that these entities conspired to keep prices on certain
magnesite products artificially inflated worldwide, including in the United
States. 194 The Chinese defendants asserted the China Chamber of Commerce of
Metals, Minerals & Chemicals Importers & Exporters (CCCMC) was a state
actor and brought a motion to dismiss the complaint on the foreign state
compulsion defense basis. 195 In this way, the District Court for the Eastern
District of New York faced a very similar problem to the court in the Vitamin C
case—whether the relevant trade chambers were involved setting the minimum
prices for the exported products. 196
In a remarkably comprehensive opinion, the court gave much greater weight
to the Chinese government’s representations than the Vitamin C court. 197 The
court observed that the government compulsion lasted a long time and was
achieved not by a particular act, but was rather created by a legal regime, such
as “employ[ing] various regulatory mechanisms producing a composite effect of
a never-ceasing correlation between the minimum price requirement and
punitive measures for non-compliance . . . .” 198 Moreover, the court stated that
unless there was a Chinese legal provision or an alternative Ministry statement
that “clearly and convincingly” established the incorrectness of these
interpretations, a foreign sovereign’s admission of legal compulsion could

191
192
193

2008).

Id.
Id. at 189.
Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China Nat’l Metals & Mins. Imp. & Exp. Corp., 596 F. Supp. 2d 842 (D.N.J.

Id. at 851–852.
Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China Nat’l Metals & Mins. Imp. & Exp. Corp., 702 F. Supp. 2d 320, 393
(D.N.J. 2010) (discussing evidence from other proceedings that might bear on the compulsion defense raised by
the defendants, including the Vitamin C case).
196
Id. at 394.
197
Id. at 429.
198
Id. at 449.
194
195
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warrant a nearly binding degree of deference, even if the admitted compulsion
was based on a form of “unwritten law.” 199
In Resco Products, the U.S. company sued Chinese bauxite exporters for
price-fixing, controlling the supply of refractory grade bauxite, and committing
other unlawful practices designed to inflate the prices of refractory grade bauxite
sold to the plaintiff and other purchasers in the United States and elsewhere.200
Likewise, the defendants brought a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
foreign state compulsion defense basis. 201 This case was stayed until the release
of a final report in a then-pending WTO proceeding with potential implications
on the applicability of the “act of state” and “foreign sovereign compulsion”
doctrines to the instant matter. 202 The District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania highlighted the striking similarity of factual and legal inquiries
between its case and the WTO proceedings and exhibited considerable deference
to separation of powers and sovereignty considerations. 203 The stay was lifted
on July 26, 2011, following the WTO decision against China for violation of its
WTO commitments in imposing export restraints on certain raw materials. 204
The most salient common element behind these cases is a country’s trade
status’s influence on its general level of antitrust regulation. 205 The Chinese
government changed antitrust doctrine based upon its trade status, protecting the
newly vulnerable national advantage. 206 The exemption of export cartels from
domestic antitrust law constitutes a notable exception to otherwise neutral
antitrust statutes. 207 In the eyes of the U.S. government, Chinese firms engaged
in activities that might be considered anticompetitive in the United States. 208
199
200

2010).

Id. at 426, 429.
Resco Prods., Inc. v. Bosai Mins. Grp, Co., No. 06-235, 2010 WL 2331069, at *1 (W.D. Pa. June 4,

Id. at *4.
Id. at *2, *8.
203
Id. at *6.
204
See infra Section III.B.2. As a related matter, the plaintiff appealed the district court’s decision to the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in February 2016. See Resco Prods., Inc. v. Bosai Mins. Grp. Co.,
158 F. Supp. 3d 406, 416, 419, 427 (W.D. Pa. 2016). The plaintiff argued, “[t]here is both direct and
circumstantial evidence that [d]efendants conspired to increase prices of Chinese bauxite beginning in 2003.”
Id. at 419. The appellate court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and held the plaintiff failed
to adduce sufficient direct or circumstantial evidence of a conspiracy. Id.
205
Andrew Guzman has developed the most detailed argument on how a country’s trade status influences
its general level of antitrust regulation. See supra Section II.B.
206
See Weimin Shen, The Role of Transnational Legal Process in Enforcing WTO Law and Competition
Policy, 30 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 59 (2020–2021).
207
Id.
208
See William E. Perry, U.S. Antidumping Law and the Vitamin C Case: An Important but Forgotten
Issue, 2 CHINA L. CONNECT 47 (2018) (suggesting it is important to understand the motivation of governments
201
202
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The great majority of the harm is felt by foreigners (U.S. purchasers), while local
firms (Chinese firms) feel the benefits. 209
What, then, might be the potential or available policy tools to address these
types of problems? At least two plausible results can be pointed out, suggesting
that the extraterritorial application of antitrust law is not an effective tool in the
Chinese context.
First, foreign defendants in export cartel cases have often argued that their
conduct was compelled by foreign governments, which frequently poses a
significant challenge for U.S. courts. 210 Specifically, U.S. courts’ decisions in
this regard often followed one of two paths. 211 One is to give a conclusive
governmental statement, thereby invoking the defense without discussion. The
other path is to “pierce” the governmental statement and initiate fact-specific
inquiries into foreign sovereign involvement in the cartels. 212
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Vitamin C followed the first
path which was heavily criticized in the United States’ amicus brief. 213 In a
unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ginsburg, the Supreme Court vacated
the judgment of the Second Circuit and concluded that the Second Circuit is not
“precluded from considering other relevant sources.” 214 The Supreme Court
acknowledges that “the appropriate weight in each case will depend upon the
circumstances; a federal court is neither bound to adopt the foreign
government’s characterization nor required to ignore other relevant
materials.” 215
A closer look at this case reveals the vital challenges faced in understanding
the basic workings and structure of foreign legal systems. For example, Justice
Alito inquired at oral argument whether the Supreme People’s Court could take
up the issue of the requirements of China’s export administration system, and if

like China in establishing allegedly unfair trade practices in the first place, as this perspective can highlight areas
of U.S. policy requiring further consideration and possible reform to incentivize other countries to operate in
accordance with fair trade norms).
209
Id.
210
See Jane Lee, Note, Vitamin “C” is for Compulsion: Delimiting the Foreign Sovereign Compulsion
Defense, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 757, 758–59 (2010).
211
See Ganjaei, supra note 125, at 413–14.
212
Id.
213
See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 8, Vitamin C II, 837 F.3d
175 (2d Cir. 2016) (No. 16-1220), 2017 WL 5479477, at *8.
214
Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co., 138 S. Ct. 1865, 1875 (2018).
215
Id. at 1873.
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so, whether it would defer to the Ministry’s interpretation. 216 Justice Ginsburg
further questioned whether it is even common practice for Chinese courts to rule
on commercial matters. 217
In addition, foreign judges who rarely deal with foreign laws face a high bar
when trying to place them within the context of domestic practice and to deal
with the challenges of working in translation. 218 At the lower court level, both
the district court and the Second Circuit pointed out that there are inherent
difficulties in relying on translations when determining foreign law, especially
where the foreign legal system bears little resemblance to that of the United
States. 219
As to the second path, the contours of the foreign sovereign compulsion
defense, as understood by the U.S. antitrust agencies, are stated in the 2017
Antitrust Guidelines for International Enforcement and Cooperation. 220 The
Guidelines state:
Because U.S. antitrust laws can extend to foreign persons and conduct
with a sufficient connection to the United States, some persons may
find themselves subject to foreign legal requirements that conflict with
the laws of the United States. In these circumstances, courts have
recognized a limited defense against application of the U.S. antitrust
laws when a foreign sovereign compels the very conduct that the U.S.
antitrust law would prohibit. If it is possible, however, for a party to
comply with both the foreign law and the U.S. antitrust laws, the
existence of the foreign law does not provide any legal excuse for
actions that do not comply with U.S. law. Similarly, that conduct may
be lawful, approved, or encouraged in a foreign jurisdiction does not,
in and of itself, bar application of the U.S. antitrust laws—even when
the foreign jurisdiction has a strong policy in favor of the conduct in
question. 221

Practically, the complex factual circumstances of the Vitamin C case offer a
good illustration of how this path frequently poses a significant challenge for

216
See Jordan Corrente Beck, Jeremy Schlosser & Ke James Yuan, Experts Connect™: In re Vitamin C
Antitrust Litigation, 2 CHINA L. CONNECT 27 (2018).
217
Id.
218
Id.
219
Vitamin C I, 584 F. Supp. 2d 546, 554 n.7 (E.D.N.Y. 2008); Vitamin C II, 837 F.3d 175, 190–91 (2d
Cir. 2016).
220
U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’M, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT
AND COOPERATION (Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1049863/
international_guidelines_2017.pdf.
221
Id. § 4.2.2.
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U.S. courts. 222 Following the European Union’s intent to take anti-dumping
actions against Chinese Vitamin C producers in 2001, the court observed that
the Ministry issued specific instructions to the CCCMHPIE, requiring it to
organize the alleged firms to avoid potential anti-dumping challenges. 223 The
CCCMHPIE then coordinated a meeting with the defendants. 224 However, there
is no indication in the minutes of the meetings that the CCCMHPIE had
compelled the defendants to comply with the minimum export price. 225
According to the court’s findings, the minutes of the meetings indicated the
agreement between the defendants was voluntary. 226
There was further confusion about whether the CCCMHPIE successfully
executed its price scheme given the lack of clear penalties or other mechanisms
compelling defendants to reach price and output agreements. 227 There was
evidence that some manufacturers who had deviated from the agreed minimum
price had not been punished. 228 Meanwhile, the district court observed that at a
meeting held by the CCCMHPIE, a representative of the Ministry expressed that
the government’s regulation of the Vitamin C industry had not been very
successful and that there was confusion about the scope of compulsion when a
party significantly exceeded the quoted price. 229 According to the district court,
the CCCMHPIE is responsible for coordinating export prices to avoid antidumping lawsuits and lower-cost pricing. 230 However, the firms themselves
enjoy significant discretion in determining profit margins, and the Ministry has
not interfered. 231 As Eleanor M. Fox commented: “Characterization of China’s
behavior and the manufacturers’ response under all of the circumstances would
seem to be a question involving mixed questions of fact and law under the
Sherman Act.” 232

222
See Zhang, supra note 20, at 304–09; Eleanor M. Fox, China, Export Cartels and Vitamin C: American
Second?, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L (Mar. 13, 2018), https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/chinaexport-cartels-and-vitamin-c-american-second (noting the Supreme Court has never grappled with the
parameters of the sovereign compulsion defense, that the lower court cases are of old vintage, and that there is
much room for shaping this doctrine to modern needs).
223
In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 810 F. Supp. 2d 522, 534 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).
224
Id.
225
Id. at 533 n.11.
226
Id. at 534.
227
Id. at 536–37.
228
Id.
229
Id. at 534, 560–61.
230
Id. at 528–29.
231
Id. at 550.
232
See Fox, supra note 222.
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Another downside to extraterritorial application of antitrust law as a policy
option for trade-related competition concerns is that it is inadequate in
promoting coherence among different, interdependent policy fields. 233 Put
differently, the legal interests of the U.S. government and U.S.-industry litigants
often diverge, and the latter may not focus on the broader goals of globalization
and trade liberalization. 234 In this sense, simply focusing on the antitrust case at
issue risks missing coherence in antitrust and trade policies. 235
For example, the United States Trade Representative (USTR) observed the
ongoing antitrust litigations and filed a complaint at the WTO in 2009. 236 The
USTR alleged the Chinese government had imposed export restraints on
multiple raw materials and violated several provisions of the GATT, including
Articles XI:1 and Article X:3(a), and China’s Accession Protocol, including
Paragraph 11.3. 237 A crucial foundation of the U.S. position was whether
China’s Chambers of Commerce, which includes the CCCMC, “function[s] as
entities under [the Ministry’s] direct and active supervision and, accordingly,
play[s] a central role in regulating the trade of China’s industries.” 238 The USTR
used the Ministry’s amicus brief as evidence of the suspected WTO trade
violations. 239 It argued that China described its authority over these entities as
“plenary” and described the Chamber of Commerce as “the instrumentality
through which [the Ministry] oversees and regulates the business of importing
and exporting [] products in China.” 240 On this basis, the United States
emphasized, China should not argue differently from what it had already
represented in the U.S. courts. The CCCMC’s export-price related functions and
responsibilities should be attributable to China. 241

233
See Zhang, supra note 20, at 296–97, 312–13. The executive branch has taken a fluid stance with regard
to the export cartels, depending on the cost and benefits of using either trade or antitrust remedies. Id. Therefore,
U.S. courts’ optimal responses should not be static. Id. Rather, they should take into account the specific steps
the executive branch has undertaken with regard to the export cartels. Id. See generally Wang, supra note 37
(arguing U.S. court decisions in domestic antitrust cases may undermine the executive branch’s conduct of WTO
litigation and foreign trade policy).
234
Wang, supra note 37.
235
Id.
236
First Written Submission, Various Raw Materials, supra note 36.
237
See id. ¶¶ 8–17, 216.
238
Id. ¶ 207; see Panel Report, China—Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials,
¶ 7.1002, WTO Doc. WT/DS394/R (adopted July 5, 2011).
239
See First Written Submission, Various Raw Materials, supra note 36.
240
Id. ¶ 208 (quoting Brief for the Chinese Ministry of Commerce as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents, supra note 185, at 9).
241
Id.
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The United States won the raw materials in the end. 242 China and the United
States notified the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) that they had agreed the
reasonable period of time for China to implement the DSB recommendations
and rulings shall be ten months and nine days. 243 However, it is important to
note that U.S. private parties and the USTR have made contradictory claims
about the relationship between China’s government and exporters in these
parallel proceedings. 244
As a consequence of conflict between the positions expressed by the U.S.
executive and judicial branches, three district courts have responded to the
tension between U.S. antitrust law and WTO law in three different ways: (1) by
mostly ignoring the USTR position in the United States–China WTO dispute
settlement process, (2) by taking into account the USTR position in the WTO
dispute settlement process, and (3) by treating WTO findings as potentially
informative or persuasive. 245 Such departures from the courts’ decisions have
caused confusion about the different approaches that U.S. courts apply in dealing
with export cartel cases. 246 Many commentators criticized the district court’s
decision in the Vitamin C case for its failure to consider its implications for U.S.
trade policy. 247
2. Other WTO Cases on China’s Export Restrictions
While proceeding with the China–Raw Materials litigation, a collision
between a Chinese trawler and several Japanese Coast Guard boats in disputed
waters off the East China Sea triggered a major diplomatic crisis. 248 The crisis
led China to ban the loading of rare earth onto ships destined for Japan, putting
242
See Appellate Body Reports, China—Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials,
¶¶ 226–35, 362–63, WTO Docs. WT/394/AB/R, WT/395/AB/R, WT/398/AB/R (adopted Jan. 30, 2012).
243
China—Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials, WTO Doc. WT/DS394/20
(Jan. 23, 2013), https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/DS/394-20.pdf&Open=
True.
244
See, e.g., Wang, supra note 37.
245
Id. at 1097.
246
See Zhang, supra note 20, at 301 (arguing the district court’s decision in the Vitamin C Case represents
a clear departure from the more deferential approach taken by the courts in the raw material cases, giving rise to
confusion about the standards that courts apply in deciding how to deal with comity-related defense).
247
See Michael N. Sohn & Jesse Solomon, Lingering Questions on Foreign Sovereignty and Separation
of Powers After the Vitamin C Price-Fixing Verdict, 28 ANTITRUST ABA 78, 83 (2013). In the view of both the
Ministry and the USTR, there may be a conflict between U.S. antitrust law and Chinese regulations that mandate
that vitamin C manufacturers coordinate a price and enforce it, on penalty of losing their export licenses. Id.
However, the district court found China’s similar regulatory regime in the Vitamin C litigation not to be
sufficiently mandatory to apply international comity principles. Id.
248
See Mark Wu, China’s Export Restrictions and the Limits of WTO Law, 16 WORLD TRADE REV. 673,
678 (2017).
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pressure on Japanese high-tech companies who rely on rare earth imports. 249
This incident also brought attention to a series of export restrictions by China on
rare earth minerals. 250 China has been restructuring its domestic rare earth
industry while putting more restrictions on rare earth exports, which has
dramatically affected the price and quantity of rare earths available in the global
market. 251 In particular, China is a major global producer of many raw materials
and, in some cases, the dominant producer. The government has made the
development of its rare earth resources a top priority since the 1980s. 252 By
2011, China accounted for over ninety-seven percent of rare earth global
production. 253
On March 13, 2012, the United States requested consultations with China
regarding China’s restrictions on exporting various forms of rare earth elements
tungsten and molybdenum. 254 The USTR cited several of China’s published and
unpublished measures (including certain quota administration measures) that
imposed export restrictions. 255 The United States asserted that such export
quotas themselves, and the manner in which they are administered, are
inconsistent with China’s obligations under Articles XI:1 and X:3(a) of GATT
and China’s Protocol of Accession. 256 On March 22, 2012, the European Union
and Japan requested to join the consultations. 257 On March 26, 2012, Canada
requested to join the consultations. Subsequently, on July 23, 2012, sixteen other
WTO members asserted their third-party rights by establishing a single WTO

249

Id.
Id.
251
For example, the Chinese government prohibits foreign companies from mining rare earths in China.
Id. at 679. Meanwhile, foreign companies can only export rare earths through joint ventures established with
Chinese counterparts that have export licenses. Id. The Chinese government also began to levy export duties,
and both the level of the duty and the number of products were subject to it increased. Id. In addition, the Chinese
government issued annual export quotas to domestic and joint-venture firms for particular rare earth minerals.
Id.
252
For a comprehensive discussion of China’s rare earth industry and export regime, see WAYNE M.
MORRISON & RACHEL TANG, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R42510, CHINA’S RARE EARTH INDUSTRY AND EXPORT
REGIME: ECONOMIC AND TRADE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES (2012).
253
Id.
254
See Panel Report, Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten, and Molybdenum,
WTO Doc. WT/DS431/R (adopted Mar. 26, 2014).
255
See First Written Submission of the United States of America, China—Measures Related to the
Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten and Molybdenum, ¶ 10, WT/DS431 (Oct. 30, 2012), https://ustr.gov/sites/
default/files/US.Sub1_.fin_.pdf.
256
Id. ¶ 11.
257
Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten and Molybdenum, OFF. OF THE U.S.
TRADE REP., https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/enforcement/dispute-settlement-proceedings/wto-dispute-settlement/
pending-wto-disputes-1 (last visited May 5, 2022).
250
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panel. 258 China lost this case before both the panel and appellate bodies. 259 At
the DSB meeting in May 2015, China informed the WTO that it had removed
the challenged export duties, quotas, and restrictions on trading rights. 260
The preceding U.S. disputes led to another complaint raised by the United
States in July 2016 against a set of export restrictions on raw materials. 261 As a
co-complainant in both China–Raw Materials and China–Rare Earths, the
United States and the European Union simultaneously accused China of a
number of violations. These include violating (1) Paragraphs 2(A)(2), 5.1, and
11.3 of Part I of China’s Accession Protocol; (2) Paragraph 1.2 of the Accession
Protocol (to the extent that it incorporates paragraphs 83, 84, 162, and 165 of the
Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China); and (3) Articles X:3(a)
and XI:1 of GATT, regarding China’s export duties on various forms of
antimony, cobalt, copper, graphite, lead, magnesia, talc, tantalum, and tin. 262 On
November 8, 2016, the DSB established a panel to hear the challenge raised by
the United States. 263 Fourteen WTO members reserved their third-party rights
in that case. 264 Similarly, on November 23, 2016, the DSB established a panel
to hear the challenge raised by the European Union. 265 Seventeen WTO
members reserved their third-party rights. 266

258

Id.
See Appellate Body Report, China—Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten
and Molybdenum, ¶ 6.2, WTO Doc. WT/DS431/AB/R (adopted Aug. 7, 2014).
260
Id. China stated that it would need a reasonable amount of time in which to do so. Id. The United States,
the European Union, Japan, and China agreed that China would have until May 2, 2015, to comply with the
rulings and recommendations. Id.
261
Request for Consultations by the European Union, China Duties and Other Measures Concerning the
Exportation of Certain Raw Materials, WTO Doc. WT/DS509/1 (July 25, 2016); Request for Consultations by
the United States, China Export Duties on Certain Raw Materials, WTO Doc. WT/DS508/1 (July 14, 2016).
262
Request for Consultations by the European Union, China Duties and Other Measures Concerning the
Exportation of Certain Raw Materials, WTO Doc. WT/DS509/1 (July 25, 2016).
263
See DS508: China—Export Duties on Certain Raw Materials, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds508_e.htm.
264
Id. Third parties to a WTO dispute are Members that have a “substantial interest” in the matter at issue
and wish to comment on the factual claims or legal arguments made by the parties to the dispute. Third parties
are not directly affected by the decision: it is not their measure which has been found to breach WTO law or to
nullify or impair benefits, nor is it their challenge of the measure which has been rejected. Third parties therefore
cannot appeal a panel report. However, third parties that have been third parties at the panel stage may also
participate in the appeal as a so-called “third participant”. Article 17.4 of the DSU provides that third parties
may make written submissions to, and be given an opportunity to be heard by, the Appellate Body. See The
Process—Stages in a Typical WTO Dispute Settlement Case, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c6s5p2_e.htm#fnt1 (last visited Apr. 4, 2022).
265
See DS509: China—Duties and other Measures Concerning the Exportation of Certain Raw Materials,
WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds509_e.htm.
266
Id.
259
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Notably, the United States won these cases because each private export
cartel had transformed to being State-led. 267 They follow a similar pattern: (1)
one or more Chinese government agencies imposed an export restriction on a set
of raw materials in the form of an outright ban, quota, or tax; (2) a WTO Panel
later found the restriction to contravene China’s WTO treaty obligation, which
(3) the WTO Appellate Body then upheld. 268 For competition-type matters, the
WTO is an imperfect venue. 269 It can examine the trade effects of a few antitrust
violations, with only uncertain prospects of success. 270
3. Section 301 and China’s Anti-Monopoly Law
In August 2017, the USTR initiated an investigation under Section 301 of
the Trade Act of 1974 into the government of China’s acts, policies, and
practices related to technology transfer, intellectual property, and innovation. 271
A report by the USTR in March 2018 detailed the survey results. 272 Shortly
afterward, the United States and China were involved in a trade war triggered
by the United States imposing additional tariffs on its imports from China in July
2018. 273
The objectives of the U.S. action were twofold. 274 One was to reduce its
trade imbalance vis-à-vis China to save employment in the United States.275 The
other was to deal with China’s unfair trade and competition practices, such as
forcing foreign businesses to share their technology in exchange for market
access. 276 According to the 301 Report, China uses its Anti-Monopoly Law of
the People’s Republic of China (AML) to obtain U.S. intellectual property. 277
267
See Shen, supra note 206. A dialogue between U.S. courts and the executive branch could be beneficial
when dealing with state-led export cartel cases. Id. In this way, the unilateral nature of the extraterritoriality is
likely to bolster the WTO dispute settlement process rather than undermine it. Id.
268
Id.
269
See supra Section III.A.3.
270
Id.
271
OFF. OF THE U.S TRADE REP., EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATION INTO
CHINA’S ACTS, POLICIES AND PRACTICES RELATED TO TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND
INNOVATION UNDER SECTION 301 OF THE TRADE ACT OF 1974 (2018) [hereinafter SECTION 301 REPORT],
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Section%20301%20FINAL.PDF.
272
Id.
273
For details of tariffs levied during the trade war, see Chad Bown & Melina Kolb, Trump’s Trade War
Timeline: An Up-to-Date Guide, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON. (Feb. 8, 2022), https://www.piie.com/blogs/
trade-investment-policy-watch/trump-trade- war-china-date-guide.
274
See Urata, supra note 68, at 155–56.
275
Id.
276
Id. (arguing the chances of achieving the second objective would increase if the United States
cooperates with countries such as Japan and the European Union, which are faced with similar problems).
277
See SECTION 301 REPORT, supra note 271, at 180 (citing as examples the AML agencies’ multiple draft
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The Report also accused Chinese antitrust authorities of using the AML to
advance industrial policy rather than to protect competition. 278 In terms of
enforcement, the United States also raised concerns regarding transparency, due
process, and discriminatory enforcement against certain foreign companies. 279
For the first time since the AML came into force in 2008, the government is
proposing major changes to its centerpiece antitrust legislation. 280 China’s new
market regulator, the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR),
released a draft revision to the AML for public comment on January 2, 2020
(AML Draft). 281 If adopted as law, the AML Draft would provide SAMR with
more powerful procedural and substantive enforcement tools. 282
Despite these efforts, the United States appears to take the position that
China’s AML enforcement is still biased in practice and focuses on foreign
companies. 283 As some foreign businesses have noted, China’s competition
authorities continue to use AML enforcement to extend China’s industrial
policies, particularly for companies operating in strategic sectors. 284 China’s
competition authorities may continue to target foreign patent holders and use the
threat of enforcement to pressure U.S. patent holders to license to Chinese
parties at lower rates, according to the 2020 Special 301 Report. 285
It is worth noting that Section 301 is too costly for the United States to pursue
as a policy tool. 286 China is not as vulnerable to trade retaliation as developing
guidelines).
278
Id.
279
Id. at 181.
280
State Admin. for Market Regul., Announcement on Public Comments on the Revised Draft of the AntiMonopoly Law (Jan. 2, 2020), http://www.samr.gov.cn/hd/zjdc/202001/t20200102_310120.html (China).
281
Id. For a summary of the 2020 AML Draft, including some significant substantive and procedural
changes, see China Set to Revise Its Anti-Monopoly Law with More Aggressive Provisions, WINSTON & STRAWN
(Jan. 10, 2020), https://www.winston.com/en/competition-corner/china-set-to-revise-its-anti-monopoly-lawwith-more-aggressive-provisions.html#!/en.
282
Id.
283
OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, 2020 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 45–46 (2020)
[hereinafter 2020 SPECIAL 301 REPORT], https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2020_Special_301_Report.pdf.
284
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, E817e8193b, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, BUREAU OF ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS
AFFAIRS, CUSTOM REPORT EXCERPTS: CHINA, INDIA, MACAU, TAIWAN (2020), https://www.state.gov/report/
custom/e817e8193b.
285
See 2020 SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note 283, at 45–46.
286
See, e.g., Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 NW. U.L. REV. 1, 51 (2012) (discussing past antitrust
enforcement conflicts between the United States and the European Union). The United States threatened the
European Union with trade sanctions unless the European Union backed down. Id. Yet, notwithstanding the
escalated rhetoric of retaliation, antitrust controversies led the U.S. government to concede that “[w]e have no
power to change EU law.” Id. (citing Deborah Platt Majoras, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, Remarks on GE-Honeywell: The U.S. Decision, Before the Antitrust Law Section, State Bar of
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countries with small domestic markets and fewer export opportunities. Instead,
the trade retaliation more than tripled the average of U.S. import tariffs from
1.6% to more than 5%. 287 Since foreign companies usually did not cut prices to
compensate, about 100% of these import taxes have been passed on to U.S.
importers and consumers. 288
Another complicating factor to limit this policy option is that the economic
and trade complementarities between the two countries undermine the U.S.
capacity to impose sustained tariff sanctions on China. 289 Abundant natural
resources and high productivity fuel the U.S. economy. 290 China’s comparative
advantage lies in its massive labor surplus. 291 The two countries are also at
different stages of development—the United States has been a mature and highly
developed economy for over a century while China is still a developing country
in terms of real GDP per capita. 292 The United States is far ahead of China in
scientific and technological capabilities, and China is eager to continue to rely
on significant technological support from the United States. 293 Put differently,
the two countries’ complementarities imply a low elasticity of demand for each
other’s products and high costs in case of a disruption in trade. 294
The pursuit of trade sanctions could lead to further countersuits against the
United States. 295 The DSU, part of the WTO rules, explicitly prohibits a
Georgia 16 (Nov. 29, 2001)).
287
See Mary Amiti, Stephen J. Redding & David E. Weinstein, Who’s Paying for the US Tariffs? A
Longer-Term Perspective, 110 AM. ECON. ASS’N PAPERS & PROC. 541, 541 (2020).
288
Id.; see also Zhang, supra note 30. More than 600 representatives appeared in a hearing on Trump’s
proposed tariffs on China. Zhang, supra note 30, at 847. Most of them opposed tariffs because importers would
bear most of the costs, while some would be passed down to consumers who would pay higher prices. Id.
289
See Zhang, supra note 30, at 846 (citing KE ZENG, TRADE THREATS, TRADE WARS: BARGAINING,
RETALIATION, AND AMERICAN COERCIVE DIPLOMACY 238 (2004); JOHN A.C. CONYBEARE, TRADE WARS: THE
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL RIVALRY (1987)).
290
See also Zhang, supra note 30, at 845–846 (citing LAWRENCE J. LAU, THE CHINA-US TRADE WAR AND
FUTURE ECONOMIC RELATIONS 117–18 (2018)). By the measure of average productivity across sectors, China’s
economy is only thirty percent as productive as the world’s best-performing economies, like the United States,
Japan, or Germany. See Press Release, Staff Report, and Statement, IMF, People’s Republic of China: 2020
Article IV Consultation by the Executive Director for the People’s Republic of China, No. 2021/006 (Jan. 8,
2021), https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2021/01/06/Peoples-Republic-of-China-2020-ArticleIV-Consultation-Press-Release-Staff-Report-and-49992.
291
Zhang, supra note 30, at 846.
292
Id.
293
Id.
294
Id. (citing CONYBEARE, supra note 289).
295
The WTO provisions at issue include GATT Articles I (General Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment)
and II (Schedules of Concessions), and DSU Article 23 (Strengthening of the Multilateral System). See Request
for Consultations by China, United States–Tariff Measures on Certain Goods from China, WTO Doc.
WT/DS543/1 (Apr. 5, 2018) [hereinafter Tariff Measures I]; Request for Consultations by China, United States–
Tariff Measures on Certain Goods from China II, WTO Doc. WT/DS565/1 (Aug. 27, 2018) [hereinafter Tariff
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unilateral determination or retaliation against another WTO member for WTO
violations. 296 A WTO panel ruling in 1999 concluded that unilateral actions
under Section 301 are inconsistent with WTO obligations except under limited
circumstances. 297 China has filed three requests for consultation at the WTO on
the impending tariff sanctions that the U.S. government has threatened to impose
on certain Chinese goods. 298
Overall, it can be concluded that the Competition Clause of Section 301 may
not be a workable policy option for the United States to achieve greater
convergence and cooperation in antitrust and to mitigate existing competitionrelated trade frictions. By imposing tariff sanctions, the United States cannot
simply inflict harm on China without also injuring itself. Since China joined the
WTO in 2001, any trade retaliation would require the WTO’s authorization. The
chances of improving China’s unfair trade and competition practices would
increase if the United States cooperated with countries and blocs such as Japan
and the European Union, which face similar problems. 299
Three policy options have been assessed: the extraterritorial application of
antitrust law, the Competition Clause of Section 301, and the WTO dispute
settlement process. No tool offers complete solutions to address competitionrelated trade concerns in foreign markets, particularly to the problems of hybrid
public–private restraints of trade. For these reasons, the United States was forced
to seek another policy option: It increased regulatory cooperation by forming
direct contacts among antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions. This allowed
the United States to negotiate bilateral antitrust-cooperation agreements,
including provisions on information-sharing and positive comity. These efforts
will be discussed in the following Section.

Measures II].
296
DSU annex 2; see also Susana Hernandez Puente, Section 301 and the New WTO Dispute Settlement
Understanding, 2 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 213, 221–23 (1995).
297
See Panel Report, United States—Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act of 1974, ¶¶ 7.71–7.92, WTO Doc.
WT/DS152/R (adopted Jan. 25, 2000); see also Rachel Brewster, Rule-Based Dispute Resolution in
International Trade Law, 92 VA. L. REV. 251, 256–59 (2006).
298
In these suits, China claimed that the impending tariff would violate the most-favored-nation treatment
obligation under GATT 1994 and the U.S. Schedule of Concessions and Commitments. Tariff Measures I, supra
note 295; Tariff Measures II, supra note 295; Request for Consultations by China, United States–Tariff Measures
on Certain Goods from China III, WT/DS587/1 (Sept. 4, 2019) [hereinafter Tariff Measures III]. In addition,
China claimed that the United States’ unilateral action had violated DSU Article 23. Tariff Measures I, supra
note 295; Tariff Measures II, supra note 295; Tariff Measures III, supra.
299
See Urata, supra note 68, at 155–58; Mark Wu, Trump vs. International Law: Trade Unilateralism in
Pursuit of What?, OPINIO JURIS (Oct. 10, 2018), http://opiniojuris.org/2018/10/10/trump-vs-international-lawtrade-unilateralism-in-pursuit-of-what.
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III. WHAT WORK IS LEFT FOR BILATERAL COOPERATION MECHANISMS?
The cooperation between antitrust authorities is not new, but its increasing
importance is driving the new arrangements. The United States appears to have
advocated for networks of bilateral cooperation mechanisms to create a “fast,
flexible, and effective” network among antitrust authorities. 300 A traditional
reason for the U.S. position is that a direct connection between antitrust
authorities can most fundamentally enhance states’ ability to cooperate in
antitrust without the need for “centralized bureaucracy and burdensome
procedures of formal international institutions.” 301
This Section focuses on two aspects of regulatory cooperation among the
networks of national antitrust authorities. First, the cooperation between antitrust
authorities with relatively similar regulatory laws and cultures in a developed
antitrust system will be discussed. Second, this regulatory cooperation at the
international level among nations with divergent antitrust regimes will be
addressed. Cooperative efforts in the latter case face challenges that differ from
state to state.
A. Information Sharing
Many studies have emphasized the need for international antitrust
cooperation agreements to improve information sharing. 302 Without at least
some sharing of information among national agencies, it is often challenging “to
evaluate the effects or legality of commercial activities.” 303 U.S. antitrust
agencies have made efforts to enter into bilateral antitrust cooperation
agreements with their foreign counterparts. As of this writing, the United States
300
See Bradford, supra note 1, at 213 (citing Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, 76
FOREIGN AFFS. 183, 193 (1997)).
301
Id. at 238. There are several reasons why countries enter into bilateral cooperation arrangements: they
1) aim to avoid problems arising from the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction; 2) facilitate the investigation
and enforcement of international antitrust cases by providing access to essential evidence that often located
beyond the reach of the national antitrust enforcement officials and can only be obtained with the help of foreign
authorities; 3) can prevent conflicts when drawing conclusions and assessing remedies; and 4) help avoid
unnecessary duplication of work, thereby saving transaction costs. Id. at 239.
302
See, e.g., Hachigian, supra note 82, at 117–22; Klein, supra note 15, at 37–45; Laraine L. Laudati &
Todd J. Friedbacher, Trading Secrets—The International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act, 16 NW. J. INT’L
L. &. BUS. 478 (1995–1996).
303
Hachigian, supra note 82, at 122 (quoting ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT, COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE COLLECTION OF
INFORMATION 73 (1984)) (noting that current information exchanges among antitrust enforcement agencies “are
at present restricted to non-confidential information [which] greatly limits the potential utility of these
exchanges, since much of the truly pertinent information will have been received in confidence from the parties
themselves or third parties.”).
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currently has such cooperation agreements with Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile,
Colombia, the European Union, Germany, Israel, Japan, and Mexico. 304 By
allowing different countries’ antitrust offices to share information, bilateral
cooperation mechanisms have enjoyed moderate success in encouraging
countries to communicate. 305
The downside of bilateral agreements is that they generally do not provide
for antitrust authorities’ exchange of confidential business information, which is
essential for international antitrust enforcement and cooperation. 306 The
agreements do not call for a modification of domestic confidentiality laws, so
that antitrust agencies could share this information with one another. 307 In
addition, the antitrust authorities cooperating in this framework “cannot use their
compulsory powers of evidence gathering on one another’s behalf.” 308 By
relying exclusively on bilateral agreements, parties in export cartel cases have
nothing to gain from a sound investigation. As a result, they are often reluctant
to aid antitrust authorities in the process of agency investigations. 309
The U.S. government has recognized that the exchange of confidential
information is crucial to an effective antitrust enforcement program. 310 The
United States is a party to Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) which
allow generally for the exchange of evidence and information in criminal
matters, including international cartel cases. 311 For antitrust-specific matters, the
304
See U.S. Dep’t of Just., Antitrust Cooperation Agreements (2021), https://www.justice.gov/atr/
antitrust-cooperation-agreements.
305
See Bradford, supra note 1, at 241 n.187 (citing Youri Devuyst, Transatlantic Competition Relations:
A New World Order?, in TRANSATLANTIC GOVERNANCE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 127, 148 (Mark A. Pollack
& Gregory C. Shaffer eds., 2001)) (“A total of 473 cases of cooperation concerned transatlantic mergers.
Strategic alliances and monopolization resulted in cooperation in 216 cases. The figures illustrate that the
cooperation is based on well-balanced mutual notification practice. The European Commission notified the
United States in 358 cases, whereas the notifications by the United States were almost as frequent, numbering
331.”).
306
See, e.g., Hachigian, supra note 82, at 139–40; Laudati & Friedbacher, supra note 302, at 481–90.
307
Hachigian, supra note 82, at 127 (“The most concrete obstacle to the sharing of antitrust information
is that of national confidentiality laws[, which] still prevent the exchange of much vital information and remain
a barrier that future efforts toward antitrust cooperation must address.”).
308
Id. at 139 (noting none of the civil antitrust arrangements allow one authority to collect information on
another’s behalf using their compulsory powers).
309
See Bradford, supra note 1, at 240 (citing Youri Devuyst, supra note 305 (referencing the case of
Microsoft in 1994, in which the company consented to an exchange of confidential information between EU and
U.S. antitrust agencies so that the two competition authorities could negotiate a settlement with Microsoft))
(noting bilateral agreements generally do not require antitrust agencies to exchange confidential business
information unless parties under investigation explicitly permit authorities to do so).
310
Id.
311
See Hachigian, supra note 82, at 140–41 (discussing the Canada–U.S. MLAT, which has been used
successfully by both countries to obtain information for criminal antitrust proceedings).
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U.S. Congress passed the International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act in
1994 (IAEAA). 312 The Act authorizes the DOJ and Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) to negotiate MLAT-like mutual assistance agreements with foreign
antitrust authorities to exchange confidential and other information. 313 The U.S.
agencies already have an IAEAA agreement with Australia from 1999.
Recently, the United States advocated a new MMAC between the DOJ, FTC,
and competition agencies in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United
Kingdom. 314 The new MMAC includes a Memorandum of Understanding that
enables member states to reinforce and improve existing cooperation on specific
investigations. 315 For example, the parties are expected to share case-related
information that is not in the public domain, coordinate investigative activities,
facilitate voluntary witness interviews, and provide copies of publicly available
records. 316 The framework also contains a model agreement that the individual
agencies can use as the foundation for information-sharing and investigative
assistance agreements. 317 The MMAC is not legally binding—existing laws and
protections are unchanged. However, the new framework “sets a new standard
for enforcement cooperation, strengthening our tools for international assistance
and evidence gathering in the increasingly digital and global economy.” 318
Developing countries or emerging market economies that are in the process
of adopting antitrust regimes face very different challenges to cooperation. This
is because “[t]he majority of bilateral information-sharing agreements to date
have been either Memoranda of Understanding or Agreements and not binding

See generally International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994, 15 U.S.C. § 46.
See generally Laudati & Friedbacher, supra note 302 (discussing whether the United States can offer
acceptable levels of confidentiality and whether the IAEAA expresses the United States’ readiness to offer truly
reciprocal assistance).
314
See generally Memorandum from the U.S. Dep’t of Just., Multilateral Mutual Assistance and
Cooperation Framework for Competition Authorities (Sept. 2020), https://www.justice.gov/atr/page/file/
1311291/download.
315
See id. ¶ 6. More general cooperation is envisaged under the memorandum of understanding regarding
the development of competition issues, policies and laws, competition advocacy (including to consumers,
industry, and government), best practices, and advice, training, and collaboration on areas of mutual interest
(including working groups on specific issues). Id. ¶ 3.1.
316
Id. ¶ 3.2.
317
Id. ¶ 4.2. While the parties can adapt the model as appropriate, it sets out some substantive matters,
including the nature of assistance that can be requested, the process for requesting assistance, confidentiality
protections, and the scope of permitted use of information that is shared. Id.
318
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim Signs Antitrust
Cooperation Framework with Australia, Canada, New Zealand, And United Kingdom (Sept. 2, 2020),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/assistant-attorney-general-makan-delrahim-signs-antitrust-cooperation-frameworkaustralia.
312
313
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treaties.” 319 Developing countries are likely to continually follow this route in
the antitrust field given the sensitive nature of some of the information at
stake. 320 Their national antitrust agencies may not be expected to immediately
enter any new bilateral agreements. They calculate that the risks of harming
state-owned enterprises and import-competing industries will outweigh the
benefits of greater enforcement power. 321 Additionally, developing countries
fail to see the agreement on antitrust as a development priority in light of more
pressing socio-economic problems that need to be addressed. 322
Nevertheless, it is in the interest of both developed and developing countries
to create stable and efficient antitrust regimes all over the world. Developing
countries’ calculus would likely change as commerce becomes increasingly
international and escapes their regulations. Therefore, the United States should
strive for firm binding commitments with developing countries, many of whom
are the country’s major trading partners. As in the case of MLATs, a binding
treaty with an adequate exception clause can represent a more substantial
commitment while still retaining flexibility.
B. Positive Comity
The heart of positive comity is that one jurisdiction refers a matter to
another, in the hope that the referred jurisdiction will investigate the
claim and be able to conduct investigations better. The referring
jurisdiction therefore will stay its hand, either by choice or because it
in fact has no other alternative. 323

This is because national antitrust authorities “may find it impossible to remedy
anticompetitive foreign conduct that is seriously harming their economies. 324
There can also be situations in which no antitrust authority in any injured country
is able on its own to halt such conduct.” 325

See Hachigian, supra note 82, at 151.
Id.
321
William E. Kovacic, Getting Started: Creating New Competition Policy Institutions in Transition
Economies, 23 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 403, 404–05 (1997) (noting the implementation of antitrust regimes in
developing countries has been obstructed by political opposition from state-owned enterprises and importcompeting industries lobbying for continued protection); see Bradford, supra note 12, at 18 n.57 (citing Editorial,
The Real Lesson of the Cancun Failure: The Answer is New Negotiating Geometries, Not WTO Reform, FIN.
TIMES, Sept. 23, 2003, at 16.).
322
Id.
323
See Janow, supra note 16, at 979.
324
Report on Positive Comity, supra note 26, at 2.
325
Id.
319
320
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The United States took the initiative by leading discussions of positive
comity inside the OECD and has tried to build consensus for an international
agreement on positive comity. 326 These efforts culminated in adopting the
OECD recommendation for cooperation on the international application of
antitrust law. 327 The recommendations have undoubtedly partially facilitated
international consensus on comity and served as a model for bilateral
cooperation agreements between countries with similar antitrust laws and legal
cultures. 328
A bilateral agreement between the European Union and the United States
was signed in 1991 (1991 Agreement). 329 The 1991 Agreement provides for a
“positive comity” procedure by virtue of which either party can invite the other
party to take, based on the latter’s legislation, appropriate enforcement activities
regarding anticompetitive behavior implemented within its territory and which
affects the requesting party’s important interests. 330 The requested party is
required to “consider” the matter and to inform the requesting party of its
decision and the relevant investigation results. 331 The use of this process does
not preclude the requesting party from taking its own enforcement action. 332
In June 1998, the United States entered into a supplement agreement to the
above 1991 bilateral agreement. 333
The core substance of this supplement agreement is that, under certain
conditions, the requesting party would refrain from enforcing its own
See generally Report on Positive Comity, supra note 26; Klein, supra note 24.
Revised Recommendation of the Council Concerning Co-operation Between Member Countries on
Anticompetitive Practices Affecting International Trade, OECD Doc. C(95)130/Final (July 28, 1995). Earlier
recommendations include: OECD Doc. C(567)53/Final (Oct. 5, 1967); OECD Doc. C(73)99/Final (July 3,
1973); OECD Doc. C(79)154/Final (Sept. 25, 1979); and OECD Doc. C(86)44/Final (May 21,1986).
328
Such bilateral agreements were signed by the United States with Australia, Brazil, Canada, the
European Commission, Germany, Israel, Japan, and Mexico. Bradford, supra note 1, at 228 (noting a
comprehensive agreement between Australia and New Zealand is built on OECD recommendations; it has taken
place in the context of an extensive trade agreement between countries with highly similar antitrust laws and
legal cultures); see Competition Co-operation and Enforcement: Inventory of Co-operation Agreements, OECD
(2021), https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/competition-inventory-list-of-cooperation-agreements.pdf.
329
See Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Commission of the
European Communities Regarding the Application of Their Competition Laws, Sept. 23, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1491
(1991) [hereinafter Competition Laws Agreement]; accord Decision of the Council and Commission 98/386/EC,
1998 O.J. (L 173) 26.
330
See Competition Laws Agreement, supra note 329, art. V. The term positive comity is not used in the
agreement, but the concept is contained in Article V. See id.
331
Id.
332
Id.
333
See Agreement between the European Communities and the Government of the United States of
America on the Application of Positive Comity Principles in the Enforcement of Their Competition Laws, 1998
O.J. (L 173) 28.
326
327
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competition laws and would agree to request the requested party to
apply its domestic laws. In such instances, the requesting party
consents not to use its domestic laws extraterritorially—if it wishes to
do so, it is required to explain the reasons for such action. The
requested party must thoroughly investigate the matter and report the
results to the other party, and also comply with the other party’s
request to the extent reasonable. 334

In the eyes of the United States, this is a policy tool that needs to develop
further. 335 In some cases, hopefully, it can develop into a mechanism for
addressing cartel exports and abuse of dominance/monopolization cases. 336
Nevertheless, the United States rarely engages in bilateral cooperation on
positive comity with developing countries or emerging market economies that
are adopting antitrust regimes. Suppose a bilateral agreement on positive comity
is signed between a net importing country and a net exporting country. A few of
limitations are worth considering here. 337
1. Illegality in the Requested Country
Positive comity is generally only applicable in cases where there is a
violation of the antitrust law of the requested party. Thus, if the anticompetitive
activity at issue was exempt from the laws of the requested party, or if it fell
under exceptions under such laws, positive comity would fail. 338 As discussed,
emerging open economies, whose firms export a high percentage of their goods
Chang, supra note 12, at 31.
See Janow, supra note 16, at 979.
336
Abuse of dominance/monopolization cases are those in which parties under investigation face
potentially significant fines and other sanctions. See Report on Positive Comity, supra note 26, ¶ 60. U.S.
Assistant Attorney General Joel Klein commented that positive comity has several benefits:
334
335

First, competition authorities tend to have a stake in taking such complaints seriously, even if
they do involve foreign access, because they also involve alleged harm to consumers in the
country where the conduct is occurring. Second, such a process makes it much more likely that
the evidence required to decide such cases properly can be obtained, since the conduct is
occurring in the requested country, and jurisdictional and practical limitations may limit the
ability of the requesting country to obtain the evidence. Finally, the positive comity approach
should increase the credibility of competition laws and competition authorities, since this
approach can address at least some market access issues through a systematic competition lawbased approach.
Joel Klein, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Antitrust Div., Anticipating the Millennium: International
Antitrust Enforcement at the End of the Twentieth Century (Oct. 16, 1997), in Fordham Corporate Law
Institute’s 24th Annual Conference on International Law and Policy, at 14.
337
See Spencer Weber Waller, The Twilight of Comity, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 563, 570 (2000)
(arguing U.S. courts have proved incapable of applying a full comity interest balancing approach in a consistent
and principled manner, and that courts use comity in these cases more sparingly).
338
See Report on Positive Comity, supra note 26, ¶ 51.
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and whose consumers import a high percentage of their consumption, either do
not have effective competition laws or do not apply their competition laws to
conduct beyond their borders. 339 If the requested party is a developing country,
a certain practice may be legal. That is, firms engaging in such practices may be
exempted from national antitrust in their home market if they have no
detrimental effect on home consumers. 340 In contrast, a developed country as the
requesting party may view such a practice as being anticompetitive, and
therefore it might once again have incentive to apply its own laws
extraterritorially. 341
Even if export cartels produced trade-restrictive effects, the importing
country’s antitrust authority may still determine that the rule of reason justifies
non-regulation of such practices. This determination is based on the finding that
procompetitive effects outweigh anticompetitive effects. 342 Put another way,
certain activity may harm foreign traders’ interests, but it is still considered
“procompetitive” under the importing market’s antitrust law. 343 If the exporting
country requested that the importing country regulate such activities in
accordance with a positive comity agreement, such a request would not normally
be served because such activities may not be violations of the requested
country’s antitrust law. 344 Indeed, it is difficult to expect one foreign
competition authority to take resources away from cases that benefit its own
economy to bring cases with more substantial worldwide benefit but less benefit
to its own economy. 345
In the Vitamin C Case, for example, the Chinese Government believed an
export cartel was an effective way to address overcapacity problems. 346 If one
reaches the general comity issue, the question will be: Does U.S. antitrust law,
in this application, unduly interfere with China’s choices in regulating its own
economy, thus outweighing the U.S. interest in freeing its economy of pricefixing and compensating victims? If so, positive comity in this context has failed.
In turn, there would be a good case for expanding the foreign-sovereign
compulsion defense and turning the issue into one of foreign law and
See Guzman, supra note 55, at 360.
See Chang, supra note 12, at 32; see also, Report on Positive Comity, supra note 26, ¶ 61.
341
Id.
342
Comity as a doctrine of limitation was first proposed as the “jurisdictional rule of reason” by Kingman
Brewster. Waller, supra note 337, at 564; see also Chang, supra note 12, at 33.
343
Chang, supra note 12, at 33 (citing Joint Group on Trade and Competition, Competition and Trade
Effects of Vertical Restraints, OECD Doc. COM/DAFFE/CLP/TD(99)54 (May 23, 1999)).
344
Id.
345
See Report on Positive Comity, supra note 26, ¶ 66.
346
For a discussion of the Vitamin C Case, see Section III.B.1.
339
340
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interpretation of the defense. This has posed a perennial challenge to U.S. courts
deciding such cases under its own antitrust law. 347
2. Confidence among Competition Authorities
Positive comity requires a certain degree of trust and confidence by the
referring agency that the referred jurisdiction has and will undertake a serious
investigation. 348 In this regard, the referral process can introduce some
accountability into the investigation. 349 However, it will not change the
fundamental nature of the agency that is the recipient of the referral. 350 Hence,
if the antitrust agency that receives the referral is a weak one with no compulsory
powers, no tradition of enforcement, no independent authority, etc., it will not
gain power by relying on the referral. 351
It is unlikely that many states have the trust and confidence needed for this
positive comity. 352 In particular, only imperfectly competitive industries in
emerging open economies are of concern here because firms in competitive
industries are not problematic from an antitrust perspective. In these cases, one
party might request another to investigate a matter despite worries about the
latter’s ability to remedy the situation. 353 The requesting party foregoes its best
opportunity to remedy the conduct. 354 However, unless the requesting party has
continuing confidence in the requested party’s legal tools, commitment, and
independence, it is unlikely to defer or suspend its own proceedings during any
proceeding by the requested party. 355 In other words, if the requesting party does
not trust the competence, willingness, and enforcement level of the requested
party’s competition authorities, it would seem logically difficult to rely on the
requested party’s diligence in investigation and regulation in this context. 356 As
a result, the requesting party would potentially be tempted to engage in the
extraterritorial application of its own antitrust law.357

347

Id.
See Janow, supra note 16, at 979 (arguing positive comity can be a useful tool under certain
circumstances).
349
Id.
350
Id.
351
Id.
352
See Report on Positive Comity, supra note 26, at 23.
353
Id. ¶ 53.
354
Id. at 23.
355
Id.
356
See Chang, supra note 12, at 32.
357
Id.
348
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It is unclear to what extent the experience of other forms of enforcement
cooperation has established the kind of trust and confidence needed for this
cooperation. 358 In a word, positive comity is likely to work best when
jurisdictions look at a problem in the same way.
3. The Reciprocity Problem
The ultimate impact of positive comity will largely depend on whether
competition authorities are willing and able to establish a culture of cooperation
“in which agencies can justify bringing some cases for the primary benefit of
others on the basis of the benefits they expect to receive from cases brought by
others.” 359 In this sense, when a bilateral agreement concerning positive comity
was to be entered between a net importer country and a net exporter country, the
former would often be the requesting party. The latter would serve as the
requested party, which may lead to difficulties of reciprocity. 360
For example, the China’s National Development and Reform Commission
concluded its antitrust investigations against Qualcomm and issued an
administrative sanction on February 10, 2015. 361 The anti-monopoly
enforcement agency concluded that Qualcomm had abused its dominant market
position and that the firm’s practices “restricted and excluded market
competition, hampered innovation and technology development, harmed
consumers’ rights and interests,” and thus had violated the Chinese AML. 362
Now it is assumed that the United States emphatically urges or even compels
Qualcomm and a competing intellectual property owner to fix royalty rates on
patents used in China’s mobile phone market. The United States does so by
ensuring that its firms realize the actual value of their intellectual property to
preserve the integrity of U.S. intellectual property, thereby maintaining the
firms’ and the nation’s competitiveness in the world. Suppose that U.S. courts
favor China’s choices in regulating its own economy, applying the principle of
“positive comity” in the Vitamin C Case. In response, would the courts of China
reciprocally withhold antitrust enforcement against Qualcomm and its
competitor?

Id. at 32–33.
See Report on Positive Comity, supra note 26, ¶ 66.
360
See, e.g., Fox, supra note 222; Chang, supra note 12, at 33–34.
361
Joe Zhang, China’s Antitrust Crackdown Hits Qualcomm with US $975 Million Fine: What Can Other
Host States Learn from the Story?, INV. TREATY NEWS (May 21, 2015) https://www.iisd.org/itn/en/2015/05/21/
chinas-antitrust-crackdown-hits-qualcomm-with-us975-million-fine-what-can-other-host-states-learn-fromthe-story.
362
Id.
358
359
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Put another way, because net importers’ and exporters’ interests diverge,
they have often found themselves in opposing alliances. Developed economies
often demand a “level playing field” and need better access to developing
countries’ markets. 363 Developed economies accuse developing countries of
failing to provide effective market access to foreign suppliers because they did
not exercise control over local companies’ anticompetitive practices. 364 In
contrast, developing countries pay less attention to market access and transaction
costs. 365 They are more worried about their inability to control the
anticompetitive behaviors of multinational corporations (MNCs) due to the
global merger wave and the growing presence of MNCs in developing
countries. 366 They also tend to use their antitrust laws to advance domestic
industry attendants rather than protect competition in world markets. It is
therefore not difficult to predict that even if comity vastly expanded, it has
smaller potential benefits in a wider range of cases. 367 As the International
Competition Policy Advisory Committee report concluded: “While it is apparent
that government representatives still maintain visible support for positive
comity, the emphasis now has shifted to the ‘limited role’ it can achieve in
international cooperation.” 368
Taken together, there are sound reasons to ask whether an overall program
involving expanded and deepened cooperative enforcement efforts solely on a
bilateral basis is a risky option. This policy option requires a certain degree of
trust and confidence, particularly given the U.S. tendency to import goods from
emerging open markets. Additionally, coherence in antitrust and trade policies
relying solely on bilateral cooperation mechanisms has not adequately
advanced.

363
See Bradford, International Antitrust Negotiations and the False Hope of the WTO, 48 HARV. INT’L
L.J. 383, 419 (2007).
364
Id. (citing Bernard M. Hoekman & Kamal Saggi, International Cooperation on Domestic Policies:
Lessons from the WTO Competition Policy Debate, in ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND MULTILATERAL TRADE
COOPERATION 439, 446 (Simon J. Evenett & Bernard M. Hoekman eds., 2006)).
365
Id.
366
Id. (citing Ross C. Singleton, Competition Policy for Developing Countries: A Long-Run, Entry-Based
Approach, 15 CONTEMP. ECON. POL. 1, 5 (1997); Ajit Singh & Rahule Dhumale, Competition Policy,
Development, and Developing Countries, in WHAT GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS? 122 (Philip Arestis, Michelle
Baddeley & John McCombie eds., 2001)).
367
See Report on Positive Comity, supra note 26, ¶ 67.
368
See ICPAC REPORT, supra note 5, at 235.
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CONCLUSION
This Article begins with an empirical inquiry into the conflict between trade
and competition law and policy that has arisen due to different substantive
standards. It reveals a problematic situation where certain activities have traderestrictive effects but favor competition in importing markets. Many transition
economies in this globalizing world are likely to produce more tensions between
nations about practices that reflect a mixture of governmental and private
restraints. The specific problems that have recently surfaced—China now has a
considerable trade surplus vis-à-vis the United States; and anticompetitive
actions in China injured U.S. exporters—belong to the same family as the
Japanese issues of yesterday.
This Article then assesses the desirability and the capacity of the current set
of policy options to get at these competition-related trade concerns. This Article
disputes the widely-held view that the strategic situations underlying antitrust
cooperation among developed antitrust regimes and developing antitrust
regimes are similar. In particular, this Article disputes the conclusion that the
current set of policy options to address private and hybrid public–private
restraints of trade are feasible in all situations. Instead, the current set of policy
options are feasible only to address competition-related trade concerns in
developed antitrust regimes but are ill-equipped to address competition-related
trade concerns in emerging market economies that are in the process of adopting
antitrust regimes.
Despite the dangers explored above, the ideal vision of a global antitrust
policy is subject to intense dispute. The conflicting ideas of international and
national regulatory frameworks have yet to find a satisfactory equilibrium. This
Article concludes that the existing policy options will not preempt the need to
resort to a multilateral framework. Instead, both have a place in international
antitrust law. Given the ongoing changes in the economic and political
landscape, it seems prudent to start with a relatively modest agenda, but without
foreclosing greater cooperation in the future. Ideally, the gains available through
the existing paradigm do not make the concrete proposals for a multilateral
agreement obsolete. Both mechanisms compliment and constrain one another to
find a satisfactory equilibrium. 369 Future negotiations on the interaction should
at least include the following items:
369
This Article’s possible normative implications certainly support Professor Bradford’s view that a
workable global governance regime in international antitrust law must incorporate aspects of three models—
intergovernmental, transgovernmental, and transnational models—and the downsides of each. For a detailed
discussion of all three models of global governance, see Bradford, supra note 1. This Article’s possible

SHEN_8.2.22

536

8/22/2022 2:36 PM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36

(1) In 2019, the WTO Appellate Body clarified its approach to more respect
the challenges faced by investigating authorities in defining the term “public
agency.” 370 The Appellate Body found that the investigating authority does not
need to establish a connection between a state-owned enterprise and the
government in terms of “conduct” related to a specific transaction, but only as
an “entity” in general. 371 The Appellate Body also found that even private
entities could operate as public bodies where the entity has close ties with the
government involving particular conduct. 372 In addition, the United States
successfully had the term “public body” defined in terms of ownership in the
Trans-Pacific Partnership and the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement. 373
From these norm clarifications and development records, diplomacy and trade
may be nimbler and more efficient than antitrust litigation in resolving conflicts
between exporting and importing countries. Therefore, this Article proposes that
when dealing with export cartel cases, U.S. courts should refrain from reaching
a ruling that might undermine the efforts of the U.S. executive branch.
(2) One of the most appealing arguments for international antitrust rules has
been the recognized linkages between antitrust and trade policies. 374 The
intertwined relationship between trade liberalization and antitrust, and the need
to limit trade-interfering national industrial policies, may explain why the trade
officials at the USTR and the EU’s Directorate-General for Trade have equally
supported the inclusion of antitrust within the WTO. 375 Indeed, reaching an
international agreement on antitrust law and incorporating it into the WTO
would ensure that antitrust laws do not offset the liberalization commitments
they have negotiated in the trade domain. 376 Reforming the WTO to hear a
broader set of antitrust suits remains a possibility. When faced with the prospect
normative implications also confirm Professor Kal Raustiala’s view that regulatory networks will make treaties
more effective by making governments more effective. See Raustiala, supra note 27, at 35–43.
370
See Gregory C. Shaffer, Governing the Interface of US-China Trade Relations, 115 Am. J. Int’l Law
622, 641 (2021) (citing Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain
Products from China – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by China, ¶ 5.100, WT/DS437/AB/RW, add.1
(adopted Aug. 15, 2019)).
371
Id.
372
Id.
373
Id. at 25.
374
See Eleanor M. Fox, Competition Law and the Millennium Round, 2 J. INT’L ECON. L. 665, 666, 674–
75 (1999) (suggesting trade-related antitrust issues, such as private market access restrictions, should be
negotiated within the WTO, while other antitrust issues should be addressed in an independent forum); see also
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of certain transition economies, producing more tensions between nations about
practices that reflect a mixture of governmental and private restraints, the United
States and the European Union might set aside their longstanding differences in
international antitrust cooperation. The WTO is likely to remain a valuable
forum to negotiate enforceable commitments among many states after first
considering remedies available in the bilateral agreements. In fact, in an
increasingly complex economic and political landscape, states have few
alternatives that may serve their future needs.
(3) As discussed, the experience so far acquired with unilateral efforts is
limited, especially when dealing with the distortions to antitrust between net
exporter states and net importer states. There is a growing consensus that the
optimal antitrust regime should develop a culture of genuine cooperation with
sincere efforts to address common goals and shared concerns. 377 In this sense,
the United States should negotiate a firm bilateral antitrust agreement with its
major trading partners, particularly developing countries or emerging market
economies that are in the process of adopting antitrust regimes. While bilateral
cooperation arrangements would not eliminate potential enforcement conflicts,
such conflicts could be predicted and mitigated through the standard
mechanisms of information exchange, consultation, and comity. Any such
agreement could also lay a foundation for future antitrust dialogue that would
allow the United States’ sound enforcement practices to, over time, become
well-established in these developing countries, many of whom are in the process
of adopting antitrust regimes. They are much more likely to listen if the tone is
that of cooperation rather than confrontation.
(4) Lastly, and most importantly, any workable antitrust regime for the
integrated economy should promote greater global economic efficiency and
prosperity, thereby benefiting a more comprehensive range of consumers. In this
sense, perhaps the best solution, for now, is to strengthen a network of bilateral
agreements supplemented by efforts toward a multilateral agreement. Put
differently, the existing bilateral cooperative arrangements should lay the
foundation for a multilateral agreement and prepare countries for more
sophisticated international cooperation. If more formal cooperation is necessary,
the negotiations will proceed more smoothly due to the existing integration and
history of mutual trust. The relationship is complex, but the most plausible
prediction is that the gains available through bilateral cooperation in antitrust do
377
See Raustiala, supra note 27, at 35–43. Governments are increasingly working together through
transnational networks and favoring gradual convergence of competition laws through such cooperation. Id.
Such cooperation is likely to supplement, rather than supplant, the traditional tools of international law. Id.
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not make any possible multilateral system obsolete. The result would be greater
room for bilateral bargaining, but it would be conducted within the umbrella of
the multilateral framework resulting in more substantive convergence and
perhaps even an international antitrust authority. As Assistant Attorney General
Makan Delrahim emphasized: “We hope that [the MMAC] will provide a model
for agencies around the world interested in enhancing international cooperation.
DOJ looks forward to continuing this important work through the negotiation of
the bilateral agreements contemplated in the Framework.” 378 The extent to
which additional antitrust authorities seek to join or replicate this new
framework will also be a development to keep an eye on.
The economic and business worlds embraced globalization long ago, and the
legal world is still catching up. The journey of reaching an optimal antitrust
regime will not take place in a honeymoon manner. The ongoing changes in the
economic and political landscape have made the feasibility of establishing a
multilateral antitrust agreement within an international institution even more
challenging. The discussion above provides a starting point for if, how, and
which type of cooperation might serve states’ future needs in an increasingly
complex economic and political landscape. The optimal antitrust regime should
consider both informal and substantive aspects to avoid the downsides of each
and promote human welfare both at home and abroad.
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See Press Release, Dept. of Just., Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim Signs Antitrust
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